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I.

INTRODUCTION

Law has always followed significant changes in mind and culture. Our era is
no exception. Law today has entered the digital age. The practice of law - how
truth and justice are represented and assessed - increasingly depends on what
appears on electronic screens in courtrooms, law offices, government agencies,
and elsewhere. The theory and teaching of law must also adapt to these altered
conditions. This is not simply a matter of surface rhetoric or style. What is at
stake is nothing short of a paradigm shift in the way we think about how legal
meanings are made, disseminated, and construed.
For decades, it has been generally understood in the human sciences1 that

Professor of Law, New York Law School.
Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law.
Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School and Quinnipiac University School of
Law and Senior Research Associate, Yale Law School.
I Paul Ricoeur notes the distinction between knowledge in the natural sciences as
opposed to the human sciences as follows: "For in natural knowledge, man grasps only
phenomena distinct from himself, the fundamental 'thingness' of which escapes him. In the
human order, on the other hand, man knows man; however alien another man may be to us,
he is not alien in the sense of an unknowable physical thing. The difference of status
between natural things and the mind dictates the difference of status between explanation
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interpretations of truth and falsity and judgments of liability and guilt are
socially constructed and, to a significant degree, culturally contingent. 2 Many
other disciplines, including the philosophy of science, 3 the philosophy of
language, 4 and linguistics, 5 also recognize that meaning depends on context
and that truth depends on the ways in which it is represented. New studies of
the physiology of perception indicate that even our most basic contacts with
reality are socially mediated and constructed. 6 In short, across many
disciplines, scholars have sought to explain how knowledge is locally
constructed through both culturally embedded practices 7 and diverse
techniques of investigation and representation. 8 So too in Anglo-American
legal studies, many have recognized that legal meaning is produced by the
ways law is practiced, 9 and that rhetoric in its many guises is constitutive of,
rather than opposes, truth.10
Nevertheless, the cultural shift from an objectivist to a constructivist
approach to human knowledge has not been anxiety-free." Many participants
in and observers of the legal system continue to experience uneasiness with the

and understanding. Man is not radically alien to man because he offers signs of his own
existence. To understand these signs is to understand man." PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS
AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 49 (John B. Thompson ed. & trans. 1981).
2

E.g., MAX BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY

(1962); Ricoeur, supra note 1, at 239-243 (Noting that, "in the sense of being free from
presuppositions[,] ... hermeneutics itself puts us on guard against the illusion or pretension
of neutrality.").
3 E.g., BRUNO LATOUR, PANDORA'S HOPE: ESSAYS ON THE REALITY OF SCIENCE STUDIES

(1999).
4 E.g., J. L. AUSTIN,

How To Do

THINGS WITH

WORDS (J. 0. Urmson, ed. 1962);

LUDWIG WIT7GENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. E. M.

Anscombe, trans. 3d ed.

1968) (1953).
5 E.g., EVE SWEETSER, FROM ETYMOLOGY TO PRAGMATICS (1990).
6 E.g., Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and
Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 245 (2005), available at
http://joumals.elsevierhealth.com/periodicals/bps; see also infra note 56 and accompanying
text.
7 E.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE

(1983); BRUNO LATOUR,

SCIENCE IN

ACTION (1987); BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE (1986); RICHARD
SHWEDER, THINKING THROUGH CULTURES (1991).
8 E.g., PETER GALISON, IMAGE AND LOGIC (1997); IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND
INTERVENING (1983).
9 E.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1962); see
also infra notes 134-141 and accompanying text on cultural legal studies scholarship.
'o E.g., Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in
the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988); Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames:
Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1994).
11 E.g., RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM (1983).
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semioticians' wisdom that "it's all signs."'

2

They fear that embracing this

constructivist insight would undercut confidence in the capacity of legal
proceedings, such as trials, to yield provable truths about the world. 13 An
unbridgeable gap between what legal decision makers believe they need to
know and what, on reflection, they seem able to know causes real concern for
many. Within this late modem (or postmodem) mindset, there is a heightened
sense of inhabiting a universe of representations that seems to turn the urge for
real world knowledge back upon itself, as if in an endless regression, like some
spectacular baroque tapestry or infinite arabesque endlessly folding in upon
itself. '4
This vertiginous sense of a lack of grounding has intensified in the digital
12 E.g., THOMAS A. SEBEOK, SIGNS: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMIOTICS (1994).

1"See, e.g., ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL ch. I "The Received View of the
Trial" 11 (1999) ("The Received View understands the trial as a necessary institutional
device for actualizing the Rule of Law in situations where there are disputes of fact. The
trial allows punishments to be imposed or civil wrongs to be righted only after a careful
factual analysis of what actually occurred, specifically structuredfor the application of an
establishedlegal rule to the exclusion of other possible norms." (emphasis in the original));
see also Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985) (discussing the need for
acceptable verdicts based on an acceptably proven understanding of reality) ("The aim of
the factfinding process is not to generate mathematically 'probable' verdicts, but rather to
generate acceptable ones.").
14 See Richard K. Sherwin, Anti-Oedipus, Lynch: Initiatory Rites and the Ordeal of
Justice, in LAW ON THE SCREEN 106, 126 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005) ("[L]ike arabesques
endlessly improvis[ed] [in] monadic design, baroque ornamentation proliferated [in a]
dizzying, decentering, even nauseating .... spatial onslaught."). See also HE1NRICH
WOLFFLIN, RENAISSANCE AND BAROQUE 34 (Kathrin Simon trans., 1964) (noting that the

baroque seeks to stimulate the imagination through infinite figurations); GILLES DELEUZE,
THE FOLD: LEIBNIZ AND THE BAROQUE 3 (Tom Conley trans., 1993) ("[Tjhe Baroque
differentiates its folds in two ways, by moving along two infinities, as if infinity were
composed of two stages or floors: the pleats of matter, and the folds of the soul."). The
notion that we live in a universe of endless representations is experienced by some not as a
source of anxiety but rather as an opportunity for freedom and self-realization. See, e.g.,
VILtM FLUSSER, THE SHAPE OF THINGS: A PHILOSOPHY OF DESIGN 65 (Anthony Mathews

trans., 1999) ("What the cultural revolution now under way is all about is that we have
gained the ability to set alternative worlds alongside the one taken by us as given.");
ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE PROTEAN SELF: HUMAN RESILIENCE IN AN AGE OF FRAGMENTATION

1 (1993) ("We are becoming fluid and many-sided. Without quite realizing it, we have been
evolving a sense of self appropriate to the restlessness and flux of our time."). See also THE
MATRIX (Warner Studios 1999) (echoing the cyber-romantic credo that "anything is
possible," we hear Neo, the film's main protagonist, announce the cyber-utopia that is to
come: "I'm going to show these people what you don't want them to see. I'm going to show
them a world without you, a world without rules and controls, without borders or
boundaries, a world where anything is possible. Where we go from there is a choice I leave
to you."). For a critique of cyberculture's utopian strands, see, e.g., KEVIN ROBINS, INTO THE
IMAGE: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE FIELD OF VISION (1996).
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age. Digital technologies allow the pictures 15 and words from which meanings
are composed to be seamlessly modified and recombined in any fashion
whatsoever, while the Internet allows practically anyone, anywhere, to

disseminate meanings

just about everywhere.

The

Enlightenment-era

insistence upon essentialist foundations (whether exemplified by Locke's
empiricism, Kant's rational categories, or other totalizing epistemologies) is

being challenged by digital experience, which has helped to inspire an
alternative model of knowledge
and reality as a centerless and constantly
16
morphing network of relations.
The task before us is to make sense of the practice of law in this non-

essentialist, screen-dominated, and pervasively visual digital era. How might
legal decision makers, legal academics, and the interested public come to
15

Throughout this article we use "picture" to refer to any material visual representation

and "image" to refer to any immaterial visual referent (inspired by a picture, text, another
image, or anything else). For instance, we might speak of the "image" of the Mona Lisa
deployed in the Prince spaghetti sauce advertisements in a campaign designed by M&R
Hess in the mid-1980s. HessDesignWorks.com, Mona Lisa's, Original & Chunky,
http://www.hessdesignworks.com/Mona%27s.html (last visited June 14, 2006). Their design
presented a pair of "pictures": one, the "regular" Mona Lisa, the other, the "chunky"
version. On February 8, 1999, the New Yorker featured a picture of Monica Lewinsky as
Mona Lisa that must have been read by those who saw the Prince advertisement as (among
other things) a comment about the young woman's weight. The cover of the June 2005
AARP Bulletin similarly harks back both to Leonardo's masterpiece and the Prince
campaign with a picture of an aged, heavy Mona Lisa in the style of Fernando Botero (who
made his own version of the DaVinci in 1977). Following our terminology, the "picture" is
the AARP cover; the DaVinci reference, the Botero reference, and the Prince advertisement
campaign are all "images" to which the "picture" alludes (or which the "picture" evokes).
Many variant uses of "image," "picture," "visual representation," and the like may be found
in the literature; ours is consistent with that of visual theorist W. J. T. Mitchell. W. J. T.
MITCHELL, ICONOLOGY (1986); W. J. T. MITCHELL, PICTURE THEORY 4 n.5 (1994); see also
infra Part III.
16 See Richard Rorty, Foreword, in GIANNI VArrlMO, NIHILISM & EMANCIPATION:
ETHICS, POLITICS, &LAW xvii (2004) ("[T]he Internet provides a model for things in general

- thinking about the World Wide Web helps us to get away from Platonic essentialism, the
quest for underlying natures, by helping us to see everything as a constantly changing
network of relations.") In audio form this model may be best represented in audio form by
"the Mix" (see, e.g., PAUL D. MILLER, a/k/a DJ SPOOKY, RHYTHM SCIENCE (2004)), and in
visual form by the complex and ever changing network of relations known as the World
Wide Web (see infra notes 112-130 and accompanying text). Of course, computer scientists
and engineers who help make digital experience possible might share a different
perspective. For them, cyberculture is enabled by technology that relies on mathematical
and other scientific reasoning which may be regarded as a thoroughly Enlightenment (or
Cartesian) enterprise. See, e.g., VILM FLUSSER, TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF PHOTOGRAPHY
68 (Anthony Mathews trans., 2000) ("[Apparatuses] are omniscient and omnipotent in their
universes. For in these universes, a concept, an element of the program of the apparatus, is
actually assigned to every point, every element of the universe. This can be seen most
clearly in the case of computers and their universes.")
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understand what is already recognized in many other fields, namely, that
representations can thoroughly mediate knowledge without seeming to
dissolve that knowledge into mere adversarial contentions? 17 Securing this
realization makes way for the next query, one that typifies a more selfreflexively constitutive outlook, 18 namely: What kinds of knowledge and
meaning are created, and with what outcomes, when they are visually and
digitally constructed in particular ways? 19
Many practicing lawyers are already deeply engaged by these questions.20
They have to be. Lawyers know that winning cases means persuading their
audiences to believe in their stories of what happened and their understandings
of the legal significance of particular events and actions, and they know that to
be successful they must understand the tools of communication at their (and
their adversaries') disposal - in particular, the visual and multimedia tools that
digital technologies provide. They also know that they must comprehend the
effects those tools can have on audiences' perceptions, thoughts, and emotions.
Law teachers, on the other hand, are only gradually catching on to the range of
implications flowing from the ensuing changes in mind, culture, and
technology. 21 Legal theorists have also been slow to address in a focused and
17The split between "true" knowledge (as the product of universal Reason or essentialist
categories) and "mere" eloquence (as the historically contingent offshoot of the art of
persuasion or digital aesthetics) recapitulates the perennial quarrel between ancients and
modems, which is to say, between the scientific rationality of philosophical dialectics and
the "techn" or craft of rhetoric. See, e.g., NANCY S. STRUEVER, THE LANGUAGE OF HISTORY
INTHE RENAISSANCE 5-39 (1970). To the extent that law and truth are rooted in contingent

(historical) social practices, however, the continued applicability of rhetoric to the study and
practice of law remains assured. Id. at 180 (linking the "rhetorical emphasis on language" to
the "social use of language"). From this standpoint, the ethical capacity to distinguish
between hypocrisy and truth depends not on "scientific capacity," but rather on the
"linguistic virtuosity" of the vigilant and virtuous (Struever's "urbane") individual. Id. at
192. See also PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE 97 (1987) ("The enduring value or

applicability of rhetoric as a discipline is to be gauged. . . in exact proportion to its ability to
analyse and codify the public and political dimensions of institutional discursive practice.").
See BARBARA HERRNSTEIN SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE 183 (1988) ("'Relativism' in

the sense of a conception of the world as continuously changing, irreducibly various, and
multiply configurable does not conceive of itself as a logical deduction, or as an inescapable
conclusion ... [but rather] as the contingent product of many things: contingent in the sense
that it is a function not of 'the way the world is' but of the states of numerous particular
systems interacting at a particular time and place." (emphasis in original)).
18 See ERNST CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH 9 (Susanne K. Langer trans., 1946)

(referring to this outlook in terms of the symbolic "construction of spiritual reality").
19 Cf JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 266 (1984).

20 See infra Part II.

21 Some in the legal academy are well aware of the need to teach law students about the
new technologies. See, e.g., Fredric I. Lederer, Courtroom Technology and Its Educational
Implications, 8 VA. EDUC. & PRAC. 3 (1998); Courtroom 21: A Court Technology
Education and Demonstration Project, http://www.wm.edu/law/courtroom21/ (last visited
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systematic way the new realities of law in the digital age. 22
In this article we seek to provide an overview of what is happening to law
and the legal meaning making process in the domain of practice, and what this
visual/digital transformation requires of those who would theorize and teach
law under new cultural, cognitive, and technological conditions. In short, we
seek to construct a new framework for understanding the transformed practice
of law in the digital age. Part II spells out in more detail what the new domain
of visual and digital legal practice looks like. Part Ill offers a jurisprudential
method for exploring law's visual and digital mediation. Part IV begins to
address how legal education needs to be retooled to equip law students for
practice in a digital environment. Part V assesses the impact of the visual
digital revolution in a broader context and considers the challenges that lie
ahead.
II.

RE-ENVISIONING LEGAL PRACTICE

Here are some scenes from contemporary legal practice:
* In a recent class action against some of the world's largest tobacco
companies, plaintiffs' lawyers contended that the defendant
companies were being deceitful when they denied knowledge of the
addicting properties of nicotine. At trial a simple computer
simulation demonstrated how ammonia molecules had been added
to cigarettes for the sole purpose of facilitating the rapid intake of
nicotine. The color-coded images made plain that the tobacco
companies had designed their product as a maximally efficient
nicotine delivery system.
" In its highly publicized 2002 prosecution of Michael Skakel for the
1975 murder of Martha Moxley, lawyers for the State of
Connecticut used an interactive CD-ROM to display all of their
Aug. 5, 2005); see also Kenneth J. Hirsh & Wayne Miller, Law School Education in the 21st
Century: Adding Information Technology Instruction to the Curriculum, 12 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 873, 874 (2004). However, To the best of our knowledge no one has yet written
about the broader psychological, rhetorical, and cultural implications of the legal uses of
these technologies.
22 To be sure, legal scholars have been thinking hard about a broad range of issues
arising from the adaptation of substantive law to new digital technologies, such as
computers and the generation and governance of cyberspace or the Internet, and the impact
of digital information technology on law practice. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFrWARE, & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE (1999); RICHARD SUSSKIND, TRANSFORMING THE LAW: ESSAYS ON
TECHNOLOGY, JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL MARKETPLACE (2000); Yokhai Benkler, Coase's

Penguins, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L. J. 369 (2002); Paula
Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111
YALE L. J. 1575 (2002). However, the realities we have in mind here range far beyond legal
issues regarding intellectual property and the applicability of traditional doctrinal categories
and principles to the virtual realities of cyberspace.
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demonstrative evidence throughout the trial, including photographs
of the neighborhood and crime scene, diagrams of the locations at
which real evidence had been found, and an audiotape of a
telephone interview Skakel had given to a journalist in the late
1990s. During closing argument, the prosecution replayed excerpts
from the audiotape and simultaneously projected a transcript of
Skakel's words onto a screen for jurors to follow. In the closing's
most dramatic moment, jurors heard Skakel describe the panic he
felt when Martha's mother asked him about her daughter the
morning after the murder - and simultaneously saw on the screen a
photograph of Martha's lifeless body next to the transcript of
23
Skakel's words.
* For an insider trading case against the investment firm Kidder,
Peabody and its former executive and corporate takeover wizard
Martin Siegel, lawyers for the plaintiff Maxus Corporation (which
eventually purchased the target company) prepared a video for
closing argument that incorporated animated graphics, archival
photographs, excerpts from videotaped depositions, and other
materials to show that Siegel had conspired with Ivan Boesky to
drive up the target's stock price. Siegel's repeated refusal to testify
at his deposition - he took the Fifth Amendment over 600 times was captured by nine sequential clips of Siegel looking down at a
prepared text. As one clip followed another on the screen they took
the shape of a three-by-three grid reminiscent of the popular TV
game show "The Hollywood Squares." When the grid was
complete, the audience both saw and heard the simultaneous Siegels
turning the Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify into a self24
protective mantra.
Lawyers, as rhetoricians, have always known that effective persuasion
requires speaking in terms that their audiences understand. They are now
adapting to a culture in which audiences are accustomed by their everyday
work and leisure experiences with television, movies, print media, and
computers to rely on multimedia information. Adding to their traditional
demonstrative arsenal of maps, diagrams, models, and photographs, lawyers
(and the litigation consultants who help them) are now introducing new kinds
23 Transcript of closing argument, Connecticut v. Skakel, No. FST CR0O-135792T

(Conn. Super. Ct., J.D. of Norwalk/Stamford June 3, 2002). See Brian Carney & Neal
Feigenson, Visual Persuasion in the Michael Skakel Trial: Enhancing Advocacy through
InteractiveMedia Presentations,19 CRIM. JUSTICE 22, 23 (2004).
24 Avi Stachenfeld & Christopher Nicholson, Blurred Boundaries: An Analysis of the
Close Relationship Between Popular Culture and the Practice of Law, 30 U.S.F. L. REv.
903, 910 (1996); Kurt Eichenwald, Kidder is Settling Maxus Suit, N.Y. TIMES, October 12,
1992, at DI ("Kidder, Peabody & Company has agreed to pay $165 million to the Maxus
Energy Corporation to settle a lawsuit in which the Texas oil company contended that it was

damaged by the insider trading of a former Kidder executive.").
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of visual and multimedia displays. They assemble video previews of the
strengths of their cases and show them to opposing counsel in the hope of
obtaining favorable settlements. 25 They shoot and edit day-in-the-life movies
of accident victims for personal injury cases 26 and compile video montages of
murder victims' lives to be used as victim impact evidence in sentencing
proceedings. 27 Software programs like Sanction and Trial Director enable them

to replay video depositions for judge and jury and simultaneously to display
deponents' words on a scrolling transcript. 28 Advocates digitally enhance
photographs and create overlays of different forensic images using

Photoshop® software. 29 They use computer animations to illustrate expert
witnesses' reconstructions of crimes and accidents. 30 To set the scene for
eyewitness testimony they can use "virtual reality views" - seamless, 360degree representations of a scene, composited from digital photographs, with
which witnesses can interact, moving in any direction and zooming in or out as
desired. 31 To build opening statements and closing arguments around

multimedia displays that integrate text, photos, video clips, original graphics,
and sound files, lawyers need not rely on the sorts of sophisticated consultants
who produced the arguments in the three case examples above. They can do it
32
themselves with PowerPoint®.
The ongoing transformation of law practice by digital visual and multimedia
technologies can be gauged in part by the growing numbers of high-tech

25 See, e.g., JOHN A. TARANTINO, PERSONAL INJURY FORMS: DISCOVERY & SETTLEMENT §

506 (2004) (on use of settlement videos); Videotape: How to Use Video Settlement
Brochures (Bill Buckley 1986) (on file with the authors).
26

See, e.g., GREGORY P. JOSEPH, MODERN VISUAL EVIDENCE § 4.06 (1997); Videotape:

How to Use Day-in-the-Life Videos (Bill Buckley 1986) (on file with the authors).
27 E.g., Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855 (Ark. 1997) (upholding admission of 14-minute
video consisting of approximately 160 photographs spanning victim's life); Salazar v. State,
90 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (overturning trial court's admission of 17-minute
video montage of photographs of victim's life, nearly half of which depicted the victim as
an infant or small child, and which was set to background music including "My Heart Will
Go On" from the movie Titanic).
28 Verdict Systems LLC, Sanction (CD-ROM 2006); Indata Corporation, Trial Director
(CD-ROM 2006).
29 See State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921 (Conn. 2004).
30 See, e.g., JOSEPH, supra note 26, at §§ 8.01-8.06.
31 See, e.g., Jeremy Barnett, The United Kingdom, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 687,
693-94 (2004) (discussing use of "virtual reality" in Bloody Sunday Inquiry) (see infra
notes 130-31 and accompanying text (Part III(iv)); Darius Whelan, "The Bloody Sunday
Tribunal," an exhibit at first International Conference on Visual Literacy, Cork, Ireland,
(April 14-15, 2005); e-mail from Brian Carney, President, WIN Interactive, to Neal
Feigenson (February 8, 2005) (on file with author).
32 See, e.g., Deanne C. Siemer & Frank D. Rothschild, PowerPoint® 2002 for Litigators
(2002).
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courtrooms, 33 legal visual consultants, 34 and instructional materials for
lawyers. 35 But even more importantly, the proliferation of digital and visual
tools is profoundly changing the way litigators approach their jobs. First, the
ability to put so much of their thinking into visual form leads lawyers to
strategize their cases differently. When lawyers visualize a case, different
possible relationships between elements can emerge that remain invisible when
those same elements are described only verbally. This is because visual spatial
arrangements are different from linear linguistic sequences. 36 For example, one
can talk about information channels in a complex corporate hierarchy, but a
box-and-line chart showing who communicated with whom can make instantly
intelligible the paths of information and influence. Second, the process of
assembling and designing the visual presentations to be shown during
negotiations, arbitration proceedings, or trials forces lawyers to prepare their
cases earlier and more thoroughly than they would otherwise. Advocates must
think through their theories of the case in the beginning so that they can plan
37
for, design, and integrate apt visuals at the right spots in their presentations.
Third, as scientific and other complex evidence plays an ever-larger role in
legal disputes, the move to the visual enables lawyers and their expert
witnesses to teach their cases more effectively to judges and juries. By using
pictures as well as words, lawyers can present their cases in ways that interact
more effectively with their audiences' diverse styles of learning. 38 This
enhanced capacity for visual representation fosters in practitioners a mind-set

33 Elizabeth C. Wiggins, What We Know and What We Need to Know About the Effects
of Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 731 (2004); ELIZABETH C.
WIGGINS, MEGHAN A. DUNN, & GEORGE CORT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY ON
COURTROOM
TECHNOLOGY
(Dec. 2003), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
cttech03.pdf/$file/cttech03.pdf.

34 Reliable, comprehensive data on this are difficult to locate, but indirect evidence
comes from the increase in the number of trial consultants generally, some of whom offer
visual production services. See AMY J. POSEY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN,

TRIAL

CONSULTING (2005); GRETA RUSANOW, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND THE SMARTER

LAWYER (2003).
35 See, e.g., MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, THE DIGITAL PRACTICE OF LAW (2001); ANN E.
BRENDEN & JOHN D. GOODHUE, PERSUASIVE COMPUTER PRESENTATIONS: THE ESSENTIAL
FOR LAWYERS (2001); G. CHRISTOPHER RITTER, CREATING WINNING TRIAL
STRATEGIES AND GRAPHICS (2004); Siemer & Rothschild, supra note 32.
36 Think of this as the visual equivalent of the statement often made by writers that they
GUIDE

find out what they are thinking in the act of writing. (We have more to say about
visualization and visual thinking infra Part Il.)
17 Carney & Feigenson, supra note 23, at 34.
38 See, e.g., Richard E. Mayer, Systematic Thinking Fosteredby Illustrations in Scientific
Text, 81 J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 240 (1989); Richard E. Mayer & Richard B. Anderson, The

Instructive Animation: Helping Students Build Connections Between Words and Pictures in
Multimedia Learning, 84 J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 444 (1992); see generally HOWARD
GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1993).
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of "lawyer-as-instructor" which may, over time, effectively compete with the
more pejorative popular images of the lawyer as "hired gun" and unethical
39
manipulator.

These developments make it incumbent upon us to ask: How and what
exactly do juries and judges learn when lawyers use digital and visual media to
present evidence and argument? And how does the shift to these media affect

the way that lawyers and their audiences reconstruct reality for the purpose of
rendering legal judgment? In the next part we outline a new approach to

understanding how legal meanings are made and understood in a pervasively
visual digital era.
III.

RE-ENVISIONING LEGAL THEORY

Today, it is well accepted that our sense of history, like our sense of

memory and self-identity, is in large measure the result of composing and
telling stories. 40 Just as it is through stories that we construct the meaning of
individual and collective experience, so also it is through stories that we are
moved to blame or exonerate others. 41 But as Robert A. Ferguson noted more
than twenty years ago, "we can only tell the stories we know" - and know how

to tell. 42 Storytelling in popular culture today is increasingly visual. Digital

pictures, conveyed through television, movies, videos, CD-ROMs, DVDs, the
Internet, and traditional print media, have come to dominate our
entertainments, our politics, our news, and our methods of education, and now

they are infusing law practice as well.43 Pictures are considered by some as
more real than technologically unmediated reality. 44 It should not prove
surprising, then, that it is the play of pictures invoking other pictures (together
with other, more implicit meanings) that we see when lawyers visually
39Of course, new digital communication technologies also open up new opportunities for
questionable practices which need to be understood and effectively countered. A major goal
of our jurisprudential and pedagogic program (see infra Parts II and III)
is precisely to make
lawyers more astute observers and critics of their adversaries' digital and visual
presentations.

I Richard K. Sherwin, PicturingJustice: Images of Law & Lawyers in the Visual Media,
30 U.S.F. L. REv. 891 (1996); see also ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING
THE LAW (2000); DAN P. MCADAMS, THE STORIES WE LIVE By (1993); NARRATIVE
PSYCHOLOGY: THE STORIED NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT (Theodore R. Sarbin ed., 1986)
(collection of essays exploring the meaning of story-telling).; RoY SCHAFER, RETELLING A
LIFE (1992); DONALD P. SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH AND HISTORICAL TRUTH (1982).
41 E.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making,
in INSIDE THE JUROR 192, 193 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
42 Robert A. Ferguson, Story and Transcription in the Trial of John Brown, 6 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 37, 37 (1994).
43 See supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
44 See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FATAL STRATEGIES (Philip Beitchman and W. G. J.
Niesluchowski trans., Jim Fleming ed. 1990); JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE GULF WAR DID NOT
TAKE PLACE (Paul Patton trans., 1995).
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reconstruct reality in the courtroom. 45 Yet legal scholars have been less quick
than their counterparts in other academic fields to heed the implications of the
cultural shifts to the visual and the digital. 46 Consequently, they have not yet
adequately addressed such urgent questions as: What sort of knowledge and
meanings do lawyers construct when they picture reality for judges and jurors?
How do lawyers using digital visual displays lead legal decision makers and
the public to take up desired meanings and participate in the reconstruction of
one story, one version of reality, rather than another?
These questions, of course, are another way of posing the pivotal query that
guides Aristotle's approach to rhetoric, namely: What are the available means
of persuasion in the face of a given legal conflict or controversy? 7 What story
forms and what images, expressing what analogies, metaphors, and symbols,
are best suited to win the hearts and minds of a given audience at a given point
in time? On which sources (topoi) should the advocate draw and how should
the presentation be styled to be most persuasive? How should the advocate
deflect an adversary's rhetorical strategy? One way or another, everything we
discuss here has to do with rhetoric, because each discipline or field of
knowledge that we engage says something different about the means,
modalities, and effects of persuasion, the discerning use of which is the
rhetorician's job to practice and teach.
We may accept as a useful point of departure Aristotle's teaching that it is
the rhetorician's main task to identify the available means of persuasion in a
given context. Today, however, we need a more expansive restatement of this
task, one that incorporates insights into the meaning making process from a
variety of scholarly domains, including cognitive psychology, cultural
anthropology, sociology, linguistics, art history, media studies, film studies,
and advertising. Indeed, interdisciplinarity is the sign of our times. The
widespread recognition that meanings are socially (as well as psychologically
and culturally) constructed entails an increasing need for multiple systems of

4" E.g., Philip N. Meyer, "'Desperatefor Love": Cinematic Influences upon a
Defendant's Closing Argument, 18 VT. L. REV. 721, 746-47 (1994); RICHARD K. SHERWIN,

(2000).
Of course exceptions do exist, including Jennifer Mnookin's exemplary work on the

WHEN LAW GOES POP
46

history and theory of demonstrative evidence. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth:
Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1998);
Jennifer L. Mnookin & Nancy West, Theaters of Proof: Visual Evidence and the Law in
Call Northside 777, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 329 (2001). For a recent attempt to integrate
visual theory into the study of visual evidence, see Christopher J. Buccasfusco,
Gaining/Losing Perspective on the Law, or Keeping Visual Evidence in Perspective, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 609 (2004). There is also a burgeoning literature on law and film. See, e.g.,
DAVID BLACK, LAW IN FILM (1999); LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS LEGAL TEXTS (John Denvir
ed., 1996); LAW'S MOVING IMAGE (Leslie Moran et al. eds., 2004); LAW ON THE SCREEN
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005).
47 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC I. ii. 1 at 15 (John Henry Freese trans., Harvard University
Press 1926).
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interpretation. Meaning making and understanding become more complex
precisely because no single interpretive frame or expert discourse can be taken
for granted, and because each interpretive tool foregrounds different elements
of the object of study. Visual communication seems especially well-suited to
an interdisciplinary approach. Our culture is flooded with images whose import
may be simultaneously overdetermined and indeterminate, whose layers of
significance can be teased apart only by using a variety of interpretive tools. In
the domain of law, legal pragmatism, with its "lesson of tentativeness," as
Richard Posner has noted, similarly encourages recourse to multiple tools from
a variety of disciplinary toolboxes.48
On pragmatic grounds, therefore, as well as in response to new
developments in theory, our method of inquiry into law in the visual and
digital age is constructivist and multi-perspectival. We explore how the
meanings that are made when advocates argue or judges and jurors decide, like
the meanings that emerge from any other activities in a culture, are built from
the participants' perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and technological
resources. 49 Advocates draw, largely intuitively, from a toolbox of such
resources when they conceive and design their evidence and arguments; their
audiences implicitly rely on the same tools when they take up the advocates'
messages. We aim to make these tools and their contextual uses explicit. We
present no totalizing or "essentializing" first principles, recognizing the
constructivist premise that both knowledge and the means of knowing are
immanent, contingent, and contextually sensitive.
We offer below four sets of interdisciplinary insights into law's visual and
digital meaning-making practices today. This illustrative (but hardly
exhaustive) set of tools includes: the neurobiology and psychology of vision;
cognitive psychology and narrative theory; media studies and reality
judgments; and the cultural psychology of digital experience. No one tool or
insight explains everything, but each advances the understanding of how
advocates and their audiences make meanings. Taken together, these multiple
tools and insights from a variety of disciplines establish a network of
overlapping and mutually informative methods of analysis and persuasion.
This network constitutes the more expansive domain of rhetoric in the digital
age. Singly and jointly applied, these rhetorical tools advance the advocate's
twin goals of credibly representing reality while persuasively activating
decision makers' memories, emotions, and beliefs in their pursuit of judgment.

48 See RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 34, 84 (2003) ("[Legal

pragmatism] relies on advances in economics, game theory, political science, and other
social-scientific disciplines rather than on unexamined political preferences and aversions to
take the place of legal formalism."). Our multidisciplinary toolkit shares some items with
Posner's (e.g., cognitive and social psychology) but goes well beyond it; see infra text
accompanying note 134.
49 Richard K. Sherwin, Nomos and Cinema, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1519, 1528 (2001); see
also sources cited supra note 7.
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(i) Vision science and visual thinking: Why pictures matter. When judges
and jurors scrutinize photographs, videos, computer animations, and other
graphic materials (such as charts, graphs, and maps) used as demonstrative
evidence as they strive to reach decisions, they are doing something very
different from what they are doing when they listen to testimony or read
documents. When they look at pictures they are reading a different kind of
text 50 which comes with its own methods of decoding, history(ies), and ways
of resonating with the rest of our culture. To appreciate how profoundly the
visual turn is affecting law, therefore, we must first understand a bit about
vision and visuality - what is distinctive about visual perception and visual
thinking, and why visual displays can exert an especially strong influence on
legal judgment.
We begin with the biology and neuropsychology of vision. 51 In spite of the
apparently seamless unfolding of the external world through visual perception,
people actually construct their ideas about the world through discrete bits of
information that they assemble into visual images. With a speed that makes the
process seem automatic, people arrive at a conscious sense of continuous
perceptions. But that is not the way things are before the brain composes the
coherence of perceived reality. 52 To make order out of what might otherwise
be a chaos of perceptions, people resort to rapid sortings of data, marking their
relative importance so that they may rely on their perceptions to make quick
judgments. This capacity to sort perceptions and register their emotional
53
significance rapidly allows people to know when to fight and when to flee,
when they need to pay focused attention and when they can afford to be lost in

50 We use "text" to refer "not only to written materials but also to painting, architecture,

information systems, and to all attempts at representation whatever form they may take."
DICTIONARY OF POSTMODERN THOUGHT 390 (Stuart Sim ed., 1998). On our working
definition of "picture" as opposed to "image," see supra note 23.

11For good general sources, see, for example, STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN, IMAGE AND BRAIN
(1994); STEPHEN E. PALMER, VISION SCIENCE (1999).
52 See ANN MARIE SEWARD BARRY, VISUAL INTELLIGENCE: PERCEPTION, IMAGE, AND
MANIPULATION

IN

VISUAL COMMUNICATION

(1997);

DONALD

D. HOFFMAN,

VISUAL

INTELLIGENCE: How WE CREATE WHAT WE SEE (1998); Leif H. Finkel, The Construction of
Perception, in INCORPORATIONS 393, 400 (Jonathan Crary & Sanford Kwinter eds., 1992);
ZENON W. PLYSHYN, SEEING AND VISUALIZING: IT'S NOT WHAT YOU THINK (2006). Some of
what cognition contributes to perception is indicated by visual illusions in which people see
what literally isn't there, or by their perception of a continuous visual field despite the blind
spot (where the optic nerve meets the retina, the eye has no rods or cones to receive stimuli).
See, e.g., RICHARD L. GREGORY, EYE AND BRAIN: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEEING (5th ed.,

1997); PALMER, supra note 51, at 7-9, 33-34. Note generally the parallel to the digital world,
which is made up of discrete bits of information rather than the analog world of our
experiences of it. See infra Part Ill(iv). Saccadic eye movements are another example of
intelligent (i.e., goal-oriented and problem-solving) but entirely subconscious behavior. See
PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND, BRAIN-WISE: STUDIES IN NEUROPHILOSOPHY 50-51 (2002).
53 See JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN (1996).
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thought. At least some of the emotional associations that a visual perception
acquires attach well before anything like conscious processing occurs, 54 which
can lead to stereotyped thinking that goes unnoticed by the rationalizing
cortex.

55

Visualization and visual thinking are not only quick but also highly
malleable. Basic perceptual judgments are prone to social influence. For
example, people are likelier to see two similar objects as the same if told that
others have seen them that way.5 6 Verbal information can remold visual
interpretation and memories. In one well-known experiment, participants
shown a film of an automobile accident who were asked how fast the cars were
going when they "smashed" into one another gave higher estimates of speed
than participants who saw the identical film but were asked how fast the cars
were going when they "collided with" one another - and, one week later, were
likelier to recall having seen broken glass in the film, even though none was
present. 57 Captions guide the interpretation of pictures 58 and suggestive
questioning can induce not merely biased but entirely false visual memories. 59
Visual thinking is malleable because the images that people think with "are
'60
not stored as facsimile pictures of things, or events, or words, or sentences.
54 Id.

51See, e.g., John Dovidio & Samuel Gaertner, Stereotypes and Evaluative Intergroup
Bias, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING 167 (Diane Mackie & David Hamilton
eds., 1993); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination,in 2 HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, & Gardner Lindzey eds.,
4th ed. 1998); see also Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, "Implicit Association
Test," https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).
56 Berns et al., supra note 6. Participants were given a visual thinking task: They were
shown paired pictures of configurations of connected square blocks and asked to determine
whether the two were identical or mirror images of one another. To do this, participants had
to mentally rotate one of the pictures and decide whether the rotated image matched the
other. In undertaking this task, participants were prone to social influence. They gave more
incorrect answers when informed of incorrect answers that a group of fellow participants actually experimental confederates - had given. Moreover, fMRI scans showed that the
brains of participants in the social influence condition tended to be activated in same areas
used for visual processing. Researchers interpreted these findings to suggest that social
influence works by affecting the perceptions themselves and not by inclining participants to
adjust their reports of what they had perceived to match what they were told the others had
seen. Id. at 251
5' Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An
Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAVIOR 585 (1974).

58See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 51, at 597-601; Karen Slattery, Visual Information in
Viewer Interpretation and Evaluation of Television News Stories, 10 J. VISUAL LITERACY
26, 27 (1990).
59 See, e.g., D. Stephen Lindsay, Recovered-Memory Experiences, in RECOVERED
MEMORIES OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 142 (Sheila Taub ed., 1999).
60 ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR 100 (1994).
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There is no one place in the brain in which internal representations of visual
percepts or mental imagery "come together." 61 When people need to think
imagistically in response to a given task, they do not simply retrieve intact the
appropriate images from their neurological library. Consequently, the beliefs
and judgments that people may articulate in response to tasks eliciting visual
thinking are not simple read-offs from some internal visual or quasi-visual
mental reality, 62 any more than their beliefs and judgments about the world in
general are simply read-offs from external reality. Rather, people (re)construct
the mental images they use in their thinking as required by the task and the
situation. 63 A more apt metaphor for the mind than a library (or some
equivalent "container") might be that of a short-order cook - and not one who
instantly
dishes up just ham and eggs, but an artful French chef who can nearly
64
combine neural ingredients to create a sumptuous repast to order.
In light of these features of visual perception and thinking, consider some of
communications, can
the ways in which pictures, in contrast to purely verbal
65
affect legal decision makers' thinking and judgments:
* Pictures of all kinds, still or moving - from diagrams to
documentary photography - tend to have a greater impact than nonvisual expressions of the "same" information because pictures tend
66
to be more vivid.
* Visual displays can convey more information than words alone and

61 Finkel, supra note 52, at 400.
62 M. R. BENNETT & P. M. S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE

154, 180.
128-43, 192-93 (2003); see also WmGENSTEIN, supra note 3,
63 Recent findings in neuroscience show that people generally do not and need not build
complete mental representations of their present situations, but instead "selectively represent
the world on a need-to-know footing." To function in the world - for instance, to move,
reach, and grasp - people depend on their brains to generate "maps-on-demand" that process
sensory information and translate it into neural programs that guide appropriate motor
structures and hence effective behavior. CHURCHLAND, supra note 5252, at 309, 318.
64 See David F. Marks, On the Relationship Between Imagery, Body, and Mind, in
IMAGERY: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1, 6 (Peter J. Hampson, David F. Marks, & John T. E.
Richardson eds., 1990) ("Perceiving and imaging are not merely processes of identification
brought about by looking and listening but active performances in which specific intentions,
purposes, and actions need to be fulfilled"); see also J. J. GIBSON, THE ECOLOGICAL
APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION 253 (1979), discussed in Sharon Helmer Poggenpohl &
Dietmar R. Winkler, Diagrams as Tools for Worldmaking, 26 VISIBLE LANGUAGE 253-57
(1992).
65 For a more detailed discussion, see Richard K. Sherwin, Law in Popular Culture, in
THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 95, 99-100 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
66 See, e.g., Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Vivid Persuasionin the Courtroom, 49 J.
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 659 (1985); Maryanne Martin & Rachel Williams, Imagery and
Emotion: Clinical and Experimental Approaches," in IMAGERY: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
268, 268 (Peter J. Hampson, David F. Marks, & John T. E. Richardson eds., 1990) ("The
more imageable the material, the better the recall.") (citing work of Paivio).
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enable viewers to understand more. For example, spatial arrays,
graphs, and diagrams can show relationships between data that
would remain obscure if the data remained in tabular notational
form. 67 Similarly, computer animated reconstructions of events can

represent with clarity and precision small but legally significant

"

*

changes within a given period of time (such as the relative positions
and speeds of vehicles prior to a collision). 68 These factual details
might remain difficult for a decision maker to imagine and thus
69
harder to understand if left to verbal descriptions alone.
Photorealistic pictures tend to arouse cognitive and emotional
responses similar to those aroused by the real thing. For example,
an IMAX movie of a roller-coaster ride can induce vertigo in
70
viewers who would remain unruffled by a verbal description.
Unlike words, which are obviously constructed by the speaker and
thus are understood to be at one remove from the reality they
describe, photorealistic photographs, videos, and film can appear to

67 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN, ELEMENTS OF GRAPH DESIGN (1994); see also
generally EDWARD R. TUFrE, THE VIsuAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION (1983);
EDWARD R. TuFTE, ENVISIONING INFORMATION (1990); EDWARD R. TUFTE, VISUAL
EXPLANATIONS (1997).
68 See, e.g., Meghan A. Dunn, "The Effects of Computer Animation on Mock Jurors'
Decision Making," poster presented at the annual conference of the Society for Personality
and Social Psychology, San Antonio, TX (Feb., 2001) (copy on file with authors); Saul M.
Kassin & Meghan A. Dunn, Computer-Animated Displays and the Jury: Facilitative and
PrejudicialEffects, 21 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 269 (1997).
69 Computer animations can also depict objects or events that are simply too small, too
large, or too ephemeral to be seen at all without technological intervention; see infra text
following note 81. On the other hand, some research has shown that computer animations
may not assist legal decision making where audiences are able to visualize events
adequately on the basis of verbal information and non-moving diagrams alone (see Dunn,
supra note 68; Robert B. Bennett, Jr., Jordan H. Leibman, & Richard E. Fetter, Seeing is
Believing, Or Is It? An Empirical Study of Computer Simulations as Evidence, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 257 (1999)). In addition, animations may sometimes be instructionally
inferior to static diagrams because animations make greater demands on viewers' processing
capacities (see Richard Lowe, Extracting Information from an Animation During Complex
Visual Learning, 14 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. EDUC. 225 (1999)).
70 Tom Gunning, An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous
Spectator, in VIEWING POSITIONS: WAYS OF SEEING FILM 114 (Linda Williams ed., 1995),
explains how audiences for Lumiere's Arrival of a Train at the Station were simultaneously
terrified by the impression that the train was headed straight for them and pleased by their
appreciation of film's trompe l'oeil capabilities. For research indicating that photographs
can provoke emotional responses similar to those aroused by the real thing that in turn affect
legal judgments, see Kevin S. Douglas, David R. Lyon, & James R. P. Ogloff, The Impact of
Graphic PhotographicEvidence on Mock Jurors' Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or
Prejudicial?,21 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 485 (1997).
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be caused by the external world 71 without the taint of human
mediation or authorial interpretation.7 2 Consequently, they tend to
be accepted as highly credible evidence of the reality they depict,
even though they lack the other sensory modalities that the viewer
73
would encounter in real life.

*

*

Unlike the linear communication of words, which must be taken in
sequentially, much of a still picture's meaning can be grasped all at
once. It takes a lot less time and mental effort to see a picture than
to read a thousand words. 74 This allows decision makers to take in
more information and to develop a better understanding of the case
75
- or at least to feel that they have done so.
When people take in pictures that look real, they tend to believe that
they have gotten all there is to get. Consequently, they are
disinclined to pursue the matter further. This sense of
communicative efficacy is even stronger in time-based media such
as film, video, and computer animation, which offer the eye rapid

71 Sometimes referred to as indexicality; see PAUL MESSARIS, VISUAL PERSUASION xvi

(1997).
72 See Mnookin, supra note 46, at 16-17 (referring to 0. W. Holmes's description of the
photograph as "a mirror with a memory"); cf early photographer William Henry Fox
Talbot's description of it as the "pencil of nature." WILLIAM HENRY Fox TALBOT, THE

PENCIL OF NATURE (1844). And yet, people's ability to understand what they see even in
photorealistic pictures, as opposed to nature, depends critically on their awareness that every
picture is a representation: It is bounded, separated from reality by something that cues the
reader that it is a text (see supra note 70) to be read. We can call this boundary a frame, but
by that we do not mean what is commonly thought of as a decorative device for hanging
pictures. Being aware of the frame and its implications includes recognizing, first, that every
picture that people make is an abstraction from nature: A part of the possible perceptual
field has been selected; the totality of sensory data has been reduced to one or two
dimensions (sight, or sight and sound); and extraneous elements have usually been
eliminated so that the signal is (relatively) clear (cf. Tufte, supra note 67). Understanding
the picture requires identifying and appreciating the significance of each of these
abstractions. Second, viewers need to be aware that every picture comes framed cognitively
and emotionally, loaded with meanings that derive from that genre of representation (e.g.,
photography, video) and people's past experiences with it (through their previous
encounters with examples of that genre) as well as from the creator's specific compositional
choices using the medium in which the work is realized.
" Digital photography and video, however, make this claim highly problematic, as
WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, THE RECONFIGURED EYE (1994), and many others have observed; see

infra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN, ELEMENTS OF GRAPH DESIGN 10 (1994).

75 What viewers tend to take in rapidly is the organization of the whole and the meaning
associated at that level - think of how the phrase "get the picture" is used colloquially in
other contexts. By comprehending the gestalt, viewers may feel that they have understood
what they need to know even though they have not bothered to explore the relations
between all the parts of the picture.
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visual sequences. These tend to disable critical thinking because
viewers are too busy attending to the picture immediately before
their eyes to reflect on those that have gone before. 76 As a result,
compared to words, visual communications tend to generate less
counterargument and hence more confidence in the judgments they

support.
*

*

When pictures are used to communicate propositional claims, at
least some of their meaning always remains implicit. Pictures
cannot be reduced to explicit verbal propositions. 77 In this respect,
pictures are well-suited to leaving intended meanings unspoken, as
would-be persuaders may prefer to do - especially when
evidentiary rules or social conventions forbid making a given claim
78
explicitly.
Finally, pictures, more so than words, convey meaning through
associational logic, which operates largely subconsciously through
its emotional appeal. 79 Thus, a person may be aware that a picture is
strongly linked to an emotional response without knowing or
understanding what the connection is. 80 And when the emotional

See BARRY, supra note 52, at 32, 46 (human attention is shaped by evolution to be
captured by movement). The more realistic and engrossing the visual display, the more
pronounced this effect is likely to be: For instance, the "sensory richness" of virtual reality
"tend[s] to tie up mental capacity, reducing what is available for assessing the reality of an
object or event." Michael A. Shapiro & Daniel G. McDonald, I'm Not a Real Doctor, But I
Play One in Virtual Reality: Implicationsof Virtual Realityfor Judgments About Reality, 42
J. COMMUNICATION 94, 108 (1992).
77 See, e.g., JAMES ELKINS, THE DOMAIN OF IMAGES 68-74 (1999) (discussing NELSON
GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART (1976) and the density of pictorial symbol systems in
contrast to verbal and notational symbol systems). While there may be no "grammar" of
images, there are rules for resolving conflicts between visual cues (see HOFFMAN, supra
note 52). In addition, time-based visual media - such as comics, graphic novels, films, and
video - can be thought of as having a grammar of sorts because the sequence qualifies how
each frame is read and visual devices are used to build continuity across frames. A final
qualification is that certain specialized kinds of pictures, for instance, those consisting of
mathematical diagrams with conventional notations, may be more or less reducible to
explicit propositions (but cf ELKINS, supra,at 75).
78 Visual displays can do this much better than words precisely because, not being
themselves propositional, less of what they mean is anchored in what they "say." To put it
another way, visuals preserve plausible deniability. For example, the "Willie Horton" ad run
by the Republicans during the 1988 presidential campaign didn't say, "If you vote for
Michael Dukakis, your wife or daughter may be raped by a scary black ex-con." The ad
didn't have to, because it plainly implied the threat without having to articulate it. Note also,
however, that by leaving more meaning implicit, those who rely on pictures to communicate
may run a greater risk that their audiences will not take up the intended meaning or,
conversely, will take up meanings different from those intended.
79 Martin & Williams, supra note 66, at 268.
80 See, e.g., ROBIN ANDERSEN, CONSUMER CULTURE & TV PROGRAMMING 72-85 (1995)
76
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underpinnings of judgment remain outside of awareness, they are
less susceptible to effective critique and counterargument. 81
Now let us consider some illustrations of how skillful advocates take
advantage of these attributes of visual communication to help their audiences
reconstruct reality. Recall the class action against the big tobacco companies to
which we alluded at the outset of Part 11. How better to convince jurors that the
defendants wanted to keep their customers "hooked" on tobacco than to show
how the addiction process actually works? That is precisely what the plaintiffs'
evidentiary graphic did. Images of vividly colored ammonia molecules closely
interacting with nicotine inside a cigarette made the product engineering
process clear. Subsequent images of key "nicotine binding sites" in the brain
completed the picture. Taken together, these instructive, easy to grasp, and
highly memorable visual displays quickly and effortlessly conveyed complex
technical information that went to the heart of the plaintiffs' claim: the
defendants' denials were groundless. Their product, in essence a highly
efficient nicotine delivery system, was manifestly designed to induce addiction
- just as the plaintiffs' trial experts said. Having now seen for themselves the
defendants' product in action, what more could the jurors want? Words alone
could hardly offset the immediate and enduring impact that this kind of visual
persuasion exerts on decision makers' thinking and judgment.
Or consider again the criminal case that we also introduced at the outset of
Part II. During the State of Connecticut's closing argument in the trial of
Michael Skakel for the murder, twenty-seven years before, of fifteen-year-old
Martha Moxley, jurors heard and saw Skakel's own words appear on the
screen before them. As Skakel uttered the word "panic," jurors instantly saw
Martha Moxley's lifeless body appear on the screen as it lay at the crime scene.
Of course Skakel experienced a "feeling of panic" when Martha's mother
asked him the next morning if he had seen Martha the night before. The picture
of Martha's battered, lifeless body explains the implicit meaning of his words.
The viewer immediately makes the connection: Skakel, upon awakening, must
have recalled with horror what he had done the night before. Because the
screen-based emotional response and the reality-based response are
comparable, the viewer's emotional reaction to the picture of Moxley's body is
readily transferred to Skakel. The viewer "knows" what he is reacting to. And
the viewer's revulsion at what Skakel had done readily casts an image of guilt
in the viewer's mind. This instantaneous understanding elides the passage of
(on emotional impact of advertisements); see also LEDOUX, supra note 53 (on subconscious

emotional influence).
81 Several psychologists and philosophers have recently emphasized that intuitive
emotional responses tend to drive people's moral (and legal) judgments, in part because
people's later conscious cognitive processing tends to rationalize decisions already reached
rather than to subject them to truly critical scrutiny. See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional
Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108
PSYCHOLOGICAL REvIEw 814 (2001); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Does Learn New
Tricks: A Reply to Pizarroand Bloom, 110 PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 197 (2003).
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time - between the murder and the morning after (in 1975), and between the
time when Skakel uttered these words (in 1997) and the time that they were
replayed at the trial itself (in 2002). Distance in time and space matters not, for
everything takes place in the emotionally salient, temporally flattened now of
viewing the screen. And because this understanding is immediate, credible, and
seemingly complete, the viewer experiences little reason to question what he
knows. The defense counsel's purely verbal counter-narrative 82 is unlikely to
explain Skakel's panic as convincingly because it lacks the cognitive and
emotional salience of the prosecution's montage. Seeing is believing - or more
precisely, belief is more solidly constructed through visual understanding
prompted by visual displays.
We have discussed how, as a function of brain physiology and sensory
perception, people construct their worlds - both their inner worlds and what
they encode about the world outside. We have also noted that visual perception
and visual thinking do not occur in a vacuum, separated from other parts of
mental life. Traditionally, pictures used in law have been conceived as mere
illustrations of words. We believe that a more sophisticated approach will
better inform advocates' choices about what and how much to show, and what
and how much to tell. The conjunctions between pictures and other forms of
communication and between visual and verbal thinking, however, also make it
important to understand a little more about the various cognitive and narrative
frameworks that shape and inform legal advocacy. It is to this topic, therefore,
that we turn next.
(ii) Cognitive frameworks and narrative theory. People's beliefs and
judgments may be more or less firmly tethered to perceived reality, but they
always exceed it. To understand a conversation, to make a prediction, or to
assign blame, people always do just what they do in response to pictures 83:
84
they "go beyond the information given," in Jerome Bruner's famous phrase.
That is, they interpret and draw inferences from new data in light of their
habits of thinking and feeling, their largely intuitive conceptions of how the
world works and how things go.
Cognitive and social psychology help to identify and explain the stuff from
which beliefs are made. Psychology outlines the stereotypes that people use to
classify and judge others; it uncovers the stock scripts that guide expectations
about others' behavior and tag deviations as worth accounting for. 85 It

82 The defense contended that when Skakel said he felt "panic" upon meeting Martha's
mother, he was thinking that he might have been seen masturbating in a tree outside
Martha's bedroom window the night before. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 60, State v.
Skakel, 888 A.2d 985 (Conn. 2006) (S.C. 16844) (Brief filed November 24, 2003).
83 See supra note 72.
g4 JEROME BRUNER, BEYOND THE INFORMATION GIVEN: STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

KNOWING (Jenny M. Anglin ed.,1973).
85 JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING
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describes how everyday cognition conserves scarce mental resources by using
mental heuristics or rules of thumb to reach quick answers that are often good
enough, but sometimes seriously mistaken. 86 Psychology also shows how
people's emotions, while highly variable and seemingly irreducible to any
empirical calculus, interact with their perceptions and cognitions to guide
judgment and behavior. 87 Other disciplines also strive to articulate the
unspoken grounds of comprehension and belief. Studies in the philosophy of
language, linguistics, and cultural anthropology, for instance, indicate the
implicit understandings that people must share in order to make sense of one
88
another's words.
Of the manifold ways in which humans organize and make sense of their
experiences, none may be more important than narrative. "It seems almost as if
humankind is unable to get on without stories," write Anthony Amsterdam and
Jerome Bruner toward the beginning of their masterly discussion of the
subject. 89 Stories do much more than tell what happened, although that in itself
is no small thing. They "give comfort, inspire, provide insight; they forewarn,
betray, reveal, legitimize, convince. You can declare your love by telling just
the right story at the right time; you can be lago and create mad suspicion; you
can spur Billy Budd to strike Claggart dead." 90 A culture's stories - recounted
in religious scripture and popular novels, depicted in movies and on television,
or enacted in video and computer games - present heroes, villains, and
everyone in between confronting conflicts and one other, and thereby teach us,
the audience, how we should feel and what we should do about our own and
others' comparable plights.
Lawyers and law are, of course, immersed in stories, from the client's first
account of events in the lawyer's office, to the versions the lawyers tell each
other during settlement negotiations, to the narratives constructed for judge and
jury at trial, to the accounts designed for television news and other mass media.
Each telling is molded as much by perceived audience expectations,
conventions of genre and professional practice, and constraints of time and
medium as by correspondence to any unnarrated reality. A persuasive legal
story must be as consistent as possible not only with the evidence and the
judge and jury's understandings of the relevant law, but also with those
KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES (1977).
86 See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD, & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART

(1999);

THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T

So: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1991); RICHARD NISBETr & LEE
Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
17 See, e.g., DAMASIO, supra note 60; EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS (Joseph P.
Forgas ed., 1991); FEELING AND THINKING (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000).
88 See, e.g., CULTURAL MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT (Dorothy Holland & Naomi
Quinn eds.,

1987);

GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN,

FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT

CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987).

89 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 40, at 114.
90 Id. at 115.
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audiences' senses, developed through lifetimes of exposure to their culture, of
91
"how stories like that go."
It is the choice of a particular story (and the mode of telling) as befits the
circumstances that tends to capture legal belief and motivate audiences to take
the action the advocate desires: acquit or convict, award damages or deny
recovery. The story that works best may be as relatively mundane as a personal
injury lawyer's allusion to Rocky 92 to depict an accident victim struggling to
overcome his undeserved suffering. 93 Or it may be as transcendent as the story
of the founders of the American polity, used by Gerry Spence to cast his white
separatist client Randy Weaver as the heroic defender of Jeffersonian liberty
94
against governmental tyranny.
Or, drawing once again from one of the case examples offered earlier in Part
II, consider the narrative strategy that Maxus's lawyers developed for their
case against Kidder, Peabody and Martin Siegel.95 The case, in a nutshell, was
that Maxus, a company in the oil business, had hired prestigious New York
investment banker Martin Siegel and his firm Kidder, Peabody to prepare the
takeover of Natomas, another company. After each meeting Siegel held with
Maxus officials, the price of Natomas's shares went up. Maxus claimed that
Siegel had passed along inside information to Kidder executive Ivan Boesky,
who then invested in the target company, driving up its stock prices, so that
when Maxus eventually acquired Natomas it had to pay hundreds of millions
of dollars more than it otherwise would have. How can a lawyer invoke the
audience's intuitive beliefs so as to convert a complex commercial dispute
involving massive amounts of circumstantial evidence into a simple, credible,
compelling story line that would point the jury to the desired verdict?
The solution was to visually emplot the case as a struggle between Us and
Them, the familiar local guy versus the big bad Other - an archetypal
conception of how conflict is structured, and who should win, that goes back to
the biblical tale of David and Goliath.96 Maxus's closing argument video starts
by locating the parties on a map of the United States. Its disproportionate
enlargement of Texas, shaped and colored to evoke the state's highly popular
flag, encouraged the Texan jurors to identify with a home-grown plaintiff and,
conversely, drawing on implicit social stereotypes, to distance themselves from

91See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 41.
92 ROCKY (United Artists 1976).
93 Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About
Causation,Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 61 (1995).

94 Spence developed this narrative in response to the state's claim that Weaver murdered
a federal marshal who had come onto Weaver's property to arrest him for unlawfully selling
a sawed-off shotgun, months earlier, to an undercover agent who also (albeit unsuccessfully)
had solicited Weaver's services as a covert government agent. RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN
LAW GOES POP 56-58 (2000); see GERRY SPENCE, FROM FREEDOM TO SLAVERY 1-48 (1995).

95See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
96 1 Samuel 17:1-58.
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the defendants - those "outsiders" from New York. To enhance the effect, at
one point jurors saw the state of Texas suddenly snap out of the graphic
display as if it were shooting a line (or a lasso?) around New York.97 In short,
the visual argument that Maxus's lawyers used to construct the legal conflict
deployed a story frame that anyone familiar with our culture's core moral tales
(or the local culture's implicit folk knowledge) could immediately recognize
and understand. Marty Siegel, the unscrupulous outsider, is recognizably the
"bad guy" in a visually narrated scenario that manifestly prompts the jury's
sympathy and animosity along well-established lines.
(iii) Mediated belief" Popular visual culture and reality judgments. In
contemporary culture, most people get their facts primarily from popular visual
media. Television and the Internet provide more people with news about the
world, as well as information about law and politics, than do traditional print
media.98 Television in particular seems to open an audiovisual "window onto
reality." 99 Yet "[t]he medium is the message," as Marshall McLuhan famously
proclaimed back in 1964.100 McLuhan's critical insight was that we must
disabuse ourselves of the na've notion that the mass media operate like an
empty pipe (or, in the case of television, like a window) through which
information passes. In fact, different media exert different kinds of influences
on the messages they convey. For example, print culture usually operates in a
field of concepts and categories. 01 Television, by contrast, excels in depicting
17 Notably, this visual feature of the map graphic reflects the video makers' purposeful
exploitation of a highly popular television commercial that had been receiving a good deal
of air play at the time of the trial in Texas. In the ad, cowboys around a campfire learn much to their distress - that the salsa that they have been eating with their dinner wasn't
local (as was the advertised brand). "Hmmm, made in New York City," the hapless cook
reads from the salsa jar label. "New York City?!!" cry the outraged cowboys in unison. "Get
the rope!" In the final scene, we see the cook lying hogtied beside the campfire with the
cowboys now happily consuming what is presumably the proper local brand - the
advertiser's. According to the designers of the Maxus visuals, the map graphic was meant to
resonate with the salsa ad: the image of Texas lassoing New York State invites a rapid,
unconscious association to the TV ad's irate cowboys "lassoing" the hapless cook for
importing a "foreign" and manifestly undesirable product from New York. Stachenfeld &
Nicholson, supra note 24, at 908-09. For more on the role of popular culture in the
generation of subconscious inferences and stereotypes, see infra notes 98-111 and
accompanying text.
98 Annys Shin, Newspaper Circulation Continues to Decline, BIZREPORT, May 3, 2005,
http://www.bizreport.com/
news/8894/ ("The decline [in newspaper circulation in the six months ending March 31,
2005] continued a 20-year trend in the newspaper industry as people increasingly turn to
other media such as the Internet and 24-hour cable news networks for information.")
9 E.g., W. James Potter, Perceived Reality in Television Effects Research, 32 J.
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 23 (1988); Shapiro & MacDonald, supra note 76.
100 MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 7 (1964).

1o1See, e.g., WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY (1982); cf Susan Aylwin, Imagery

and Affect: Big Questions, Little Answers, in IMAGERY: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra
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personal dramas, offering viewers story lines and character types that are
familiar and immediately accessible. Television achieves unique emotional
power and intimacy by way of the close-up, which brings viewers directly into
the emotional field of the characters on the screen. 10 2 This is hardly a matter of
mere aesthetics. Dramatizing the personal tends to obscure the general. By
presenting social problems in terms of personal history and individual
character development, television resists the more abstract dimension of
sociopolitical complexity, which is notoriously difficult to dramatize in visual
103
form.
People's media-spawned expectations are guided by the visual codes not
only of television but also film, especially major Hollywood movies. The
visual codes that come from popular culture become a part of people's visual
common sense, which is to say, they are unconsciously assimilated. People
understand cross-cutting and parallel editing. They do not need anyone to
explain these storytelling devices. The camera is inside the audience's heads,
and they are prepared to reconstruct reality in accordance with the perceptual
and cognitive codes they have internalized.
People also generally suppose that they know reality when they see it, that
they can, by and large, distinguish humbug from the genuine article. They kick
the tires and don't take any wooden nickels. And when people "suspend
disbelief' to indulge in a novel, a film, or a television drama, they like to think
they do so "willingly." Yet, considerable psychological research shows that it
is not so easy to know what to believe, or when. Credulity, not skepticism, is
the default mode. When people readily understand something they are inclined
to believe it. 1° 4 Disbelief must be effortfully engaged; it is what people do

note 64, at 247, 251 ("Verbal representation [in the mind] yields associations which indicate
that it is specialized for representing hierarchical conceptual structures.").
102 The size of the television screen and its location in rooms small enough for it to be
seen clearly, whether a living room or a bar, mean that close-ups are especially powerful
because of the viewing distance as well as the intimacy of the medium.
103

See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETr, NEWS: THE POLITICS OF ILLUSION 48-58 (3d ed. 1996).

Other features of (commercial) television, such as the perceived need to entertain and the
generally short time limits within which most news stories are presented, also contribute to
the avoidance of complexity. See, e.g., id. at 52-64; NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES
TO DEATH (1985). Conversely, print media coverage of social problems can also tend to
oversimplify through dramatization. See, e.g., Robert A. Stallings, Media Discourse and the
Social Construction of Risk, 37 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 80 (1990). Note also, however, that
television drama has become a longer, more complex form as viewers of series find
themselves encountering characters over the weeks (and even years) of broadcast; series
writers count on the audience knowing things about the characters from past scripts. Cf
STEVEN JOHNSON, EVERYTHING BAD is GOOD FOR You: How TODAY'S POPULAR CULTURE IS
ACTUALLY MAKING US SMARTER (2005). By comparison, the stories told in court may seem
short and, because of hearsay rules, lacking in characterological detail.
104 Daniel T. Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, 46 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 107
(1991).
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when they critically assess what they have already provisionally accepted as
true. 105
The visual mass media provide people not only with most of their facts but
also with most of their fictions. Indeed, people's world-knowledge draws upon
a mixture of fictional and non-fictional sources,10 6 and they are not always able
to differentiate real from fictional sources of remembered information. 0 7 The
striking irony is that facts can seem more "factual" the more like fiction they
become. This happens because people generally are less motivated to process
fictional information systematically than factual information. 0 8 When an
audience unwittingly responds to a factual presentation as if it were fiction, the
default mode - credulity - kicks in. Critical analysis, not disbelief, gets
suspended. Effective critique requires not only knowledge of the requisite tools
of critical analysis but also the energy and inclination to undertake it. By
contrast, stored-away fictions effortlessly come to mind when a familiar
narrative genre, or character or situation type, stimulates people's recollection.
That is part of what is going on when a trial lawyer compares a witness or a
defendant to a well-known character from The Godfather, Natural Born
Killers, or The Sopranos.10 9 If the comparison sticks, the jury tends to fill in the
rest of the story, including character traits unmentioned at trial, even if they are
fictional.
The codes and content of modem visual storytelling, from television dramas
and news shows to advertisements and feature films, have infiltrated the
courtroom, so that fact and fiction, information and entertainment, work hand
in hand in the production of legal truth. For example, a closing argument video
in a lawsuit against Price Waterhouse, which at the time of the trial was the
largest accounting firm in the world, begins with documentary shots of the
largest ocean liner of its time, the reputedly unsinkable Titanic, which did
indeed sink. The video then seamlessly shifts to clips from A Night to
Remember, the 1958 feature film about the Titanic in which indifferent officers
and a preoccupied captain appear to recklessly disregard a telegram warning
about the presence of icebergs in the ship's vicinity. The plaintiffs visual
summation then cross-cuts those clips with a stream of re-enactments and other
scenes describing how the defendant sank the plaintiff's takeover deal by
carelessly failing to spot faulty loan practices by the bank the plaintiff

105 Deborah A. Prentice, Richard J. Gerrig, & Daniel Bailis, What Readers Bring to the
Processing of Fictional Texts, 4 PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW 416 (1997).
106 Deborah A. Prentice & Richard J. Gerrig, Exploring the Boundary Between Fiction
and Reality, in DuAL-PROCESs THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 529 (Shelley Chaiken &

Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
107 E.g., Marcia K. Johnson & Carol L. Raye, Reality Monitoring, 88 PSYCHOLOGICAL
REvIEw 67 (1981).
108 Prentice & Gerrig, supranote 106, at 544.
109 See SHERWIN, supra note 45, at 16-17.
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acquired.110 The upshot is clear: being the largest in the world is no safeguard
against negligence.
Or consider once again, this time from a popular cultural perspective, the
Maxus insider trading case against Kidder, Peabody. In the visual graphic used
by plaintiffs in their closing argument, the jurors saw defendant Marty Siegel
perched in a three-by-three grid reminiscent of the tic-tac-toe board featured in
the television game show, "The Hollywood Squares." When the nine Siegels
are seen and heard simultaneously "taking the Fifth," the effect is highly
comical. The viewer laughs at the incongruous sight of a once esteemed Wall
Street investment banker cast in a TV game show that typically featured
celebrity has-beens desperate to revitalize their careers (or at least make a
buck). That this response, and the normative associations that it carries, is
being triggered by an iconic game show, however, remains implicit,
unarticulated, and hence unavailable to critical reflection. The humor on
display is disarming, but there is a more serious intent at work here. The
visualization of the incanting Siegels diminishes him by implicitly portraying
him as just another celebrity has-been,"' but it demonizes him as well. The
humorous gloss of Siegel ensconced in all nine squares distracts the decision
maker from a legally impermissible inference that may also be taking place:
namely, the association of Siegel with other so-called "Fifth Amendment
criminals" who hide the truth of their misdeeds behind a wall of silence. Of
course, to say that this apparently innocuous visual display penalizes the
defendant for exercising his constitutional privilege against compelled selfincrimination not only seems counterintuitive from the standpoint of ordinary
common sense (after all, the video clips accurately depict what Siegel said at
his deposition), but also spoils the simple fun of the display. In sum, the viewer
gets the message because the visual code of a popular television game show
icon is instantly recognizable, and the critical bite of an impermissible (albeit
unconscious) inference remains hidden. To preserve the joke the viewer is
disinclined to analyze it critically.
To acknowledge that Maxus's "Hollywood Squares" display constructs its
visual argument in the form of a shrewd joke is to reassert one of the points we
have been making: this seemingly simple visual display is decidedly not a
mere illustration of ideas that could just as well be expressed verbally. To
analyze its rhetoric, we have drawn on the psychology of visual perception, the
social psychology of mental frameworks, narrative theory, and the conflation
of fact and fiction in contemporary culture and the human mind. In the next
section we add one more set of conceptual and rhetorical tools, an essential
"I The trial judge's admission of this video was reversed on appeal. Standard Chartered
PLC v. Price Waterhouse, CV No. 88-34414 (Super. Ct., Maricopa Co., AZ, 1989), rev'd,
945 P.2d 317, 359 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). See SHERWIN, supra note 45, at 272 nn.39-40;
Rorie Sherman, And Now, the Power of Tape, NAT'L L. J., February 8, 1993, at Al.
"I It also diminishes him by reducing his appearance to a mere replicable unit (and
impliedly, one that can be reproduced without limit).
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part of the multidisciplinary network of insights that lawyers need in order to
understand law in the digital age.
(iv) Digital culture/digitalmind. Good tools serve the purposes for which
they were initially designed, but they also suggest additional, often unexpected
uses and lead to new forms of understanding that inspire the building of yet
other tools. Consider, for example, the computer mouse invented by Douglas
Engelbart and his team at the Stanford Research Institute. In 1968, they
demonstrated a networked computer system that had the rudiments of twodimensional display editing, flexible view control, on-screen video
teleconferencing - and a mouse.1 I Anyone using a computer now knows how
to use a mouse to navigate and enter commands. Forty years ago, however,
these functions were not yet the highly developed technologies with which we
are familiar today. But they projected a vision of human-computer interaction
that inspired innumerable subsequent innovations, from the graphical user
interface (which permits people to use multiple applications at the same time)
to full-fledged hypermedia. 13 Just as those technical ideas were seeded in a
professional community and eventually grew into unexpected, even
astonishing fruit, exposure to and use of digital technologies is already
generating new behaviors and new patterns of thought in the law.
Advanced digital imaging capacities are now widespread. 114 In the past, a
lawyer might order a graphic from a designer and have no real idea how it was
made. Now that same lawyer probably owns a digital camera and can upload
and make simple edits (like cropping or adjusting the orientation or the
contrast between light and dark). Excel® makes it easy to graph data; word
processing programs make it easy to design pages and incorporate pictures and
tables into texts. Other readily available software allows people to lay out
entire books and to create simple animations. In short, what used to be the
specialized knowledge of graphic designers using tools affordable only by
those with professional commitments is now available to all computer users at
consumer prices for use at home or at work, as freeware, or as software
running on computers in schools, libraries, and copy shops.
The same is true for moving images. Almost anyone can make them - even
still cameras and cell phones are now capable of making short video clips 112 STIM, MouseSite, http://sloan.stanford.edu/mousesite/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
113 They also prepared the ground for computer-mediated revampings of human relations
a quarter-century before Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web (see, e.g., Doug
Engelbart 1968 Demo, http://sloan.stanford.edu/mousesite/1968Demo.html (last visited
Aug. 24, 2006)).
114 "Recent InfoTrends/CAP Ventures forecasts show that U.S. consumer digital camera
penetration will reach 55% and shipments of around 25 million in 2005, growing to 81%
and about 21 million units shipped in 2010. Camera phone penetration will grow from 31%
and just over 36 million units shipped to 86% and nearly 80 million units shipped over the
same period." InfoTrends/CAP Ventures Study Shows Digital Photo Printing Market at a
Crossroads: Growth or Decline?, InfoTrends, June 21, 2005, http://www.infotrends-

rgi.com/home/Press/itPress/2005/6.21.05.html.
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and anyone can modify anything they or anyone else has made. 115 Good hands
and expensive tools are no longer needed. Pointing and clicking have become
physical habits; seeing pictures as potential material and not just as someone's
property is one of the new mental habits. Repurposing others' visual work is
not something new. Artists have been quoting each other and learning by
copying from the beginning. Now, however, it can be done with "original"
digital data. Anyone, even lawyers, can do it, and their art can be published on
the Internet and disseminated globally at virtually no cost.
The ubiquity of surveillance and amateur video cameras in conjunction with
a broad range of readily available and easy to use image-editing tools have
given rise to many more kinds of demonstrative evidence. This was
dramatically illustrated in the cases arising out of the New York Police
Department's mass arrests of protesters outside the 2004 Republican National
Convention, in which dozens of amateur videos were introduced to refute (and
in a few cases, to confirm) police claims that the protesters had behaved
illegally. 116 But the widespread experience of modifying and manipulating
pictures has even deeper cultural and cognitive significance. The typical
lawyer may not be adept at using advanced professional editing software like
115Apple,
whose
"Rip,
Mix,
Bum"
ad
campaign
(see
http://www.theapplecollection.com/Collection/AppleMovies/mov/concert144a.html
(last
visited Aug. 24, 2006)), gave the title to habits rapidly spreading through computer users
because they are able to rip (copy), mix (re-edit), and burn (put on a disk or other media)
their own creations, has itself now been subjected to a mixing of quite another kind. George
Masters, a teacher who loves his iPod, made his own ad during after hours from work and
posted it to his blog for comment. Viewership and downloads exploded and it wound up in
Wired Magazine. See Leander Kahney, Home-Brew IPod Ad Opens Eyes, WIRED, Dec. 13,
2004, http://www.wired.com/news/mac/0,2125,66001,00.html. What is a company to do
when its customer speaks back in this way?
Or consider this digital visual information exchange: After Baltimore drug dealers
produced a DVD called "Stop Snitching," in which they threatened to kill anyone who
testified against them, the Baltimore Police Department responded with their own DVD,
"Keep Talking," which mentioned the arrests of three dealers featured in the gang's video.
Gary Gately, Police Counter Dealers' DVD With One of Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2005, at A12.
116Jim Dwyer, Videos Challenge Hundreds of Convention Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2005, at Al. Still more recently, Newark residents awakened by the sound of a car crash
used the digital displays on their cell phones to determine that the police took twice as long
to arrive at the accident scene as the police claimed (Jennifer Medina & John Holl, 3 People
Die in Fierce Collision of 2 S.U.V. 's, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2005, at B3). Such events also
exemplify the expanding role of digital communication technologies, including cell phones
and video cameras, in political activism. On this subject, see the documentary film by
Katerina Cizek and Peter Wintonick, Seeing is Believing: Handicams, Human Rights, and
the News (2002). On the political dislocations created by ubiquitous photoimaging in public
spaces,

see
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Adobe Photoshop, but in all likelihood, he or she will have heard of
"photoshopping" as a verb referring to altering a picture. 117 This neologism
expresses a dramatically altered relationship to the photograph. Today, in an
era when digital pictures are infinitely malleable, when, in the words of
William Mitchell, "the referent has come unstuck," 118 people may have to give
up their nafve sense of the photorealistic picture as metonymic truth.' 19 In
exchange, they will gain an understanding of the picture as a construct, a
than a window onto the world that
text120 to be actively construed rather
12 1
merely needs to be looked through.
So far we have addressed changes in the pictorial texts themselves. The
Internet has also profoundly changed people's relationship to the screen on
which those texts are seen. On cinema screens, people became accustomed to
seeing their dreams writ large while sitting with others in a dark, cavernous
room. Television, by contrast, with its comparatively small screen, brought
news of the world and entertainment into the intimate sphere of the household,
becoming a character in family life, a familiar. Personal computer screens
differ from both. 122 Unlike televisions, where groups can gather around for
Adobe, like Xerox, is troubled by having its brand name turned into a verb. See
http://www.adobe.com/misc/
of
Use,
Terms
Incorporated
Systems
Adobe
trade.htmIl#photoshop (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
"'8MITCHELL, THE RECONFIGURED EYE, supra note 78, at 31. For a thorough review of
the changing status of the photograph as it moved from being an analog medium to a digital
medium, readers should read Mitchell's entire chapter, which covers a variety of issues of
legal interest.
117

119Id. at 26-58.
120 On pictures as texts, see supra note 55. See id. at 119; ANN KIBBEY, THEORY OF THE
IMAGE: CAPITALISM, CONTEMPORARY FILM, AND WOMEN 12-18 (2005);.
2' See FRED RITCHIN, IN OUR OWN IMAGE: THE COMING REVOLUTION IN PHOTOGRAPHY

124 (1999) ("Photography, for 150 years basically a perceptual medium, can now become a
largely conceptual one as well.")
Legal "texts" in the more literal sense of the word are also problematized in the digital
age, and in particular, in the age of the Internet. The Internet is creating a new mass digital
culture increasingly made up of hybrid texts - and hypertexts - which promote a different
form of reading than, say, the traditional law book, in which any graphic or pictorial
material is comfortably situated as an illustration, encapsulated by its labeling. A hybrid
text, made of words and pictures (or other combinations of media), is what people see every
time they open a browser to explore the World Wide Web. Legal texts like statutes, judicial
opinions, and law review articles have been online since the mid-1970s (F. Allan Hanson,
From Key Words to Key Numbers: How Automation Has Transformed the Law, 94 LAW
LIB. J.563, 573 (2002)), and already come packaged with abstracts, hyperlinked crossreferences, symbols coded to elicit different kinds of attention from readers, and various
explanatory materials. How will such texts be modified to accommodate the expectations of
lawyers and a public who have internalized new habits of reading word/picture hybrids?
When a trial turns on the presentation of digital visual material, what will be the "official"
text be?
122 The new screen that arrived with the personal computing revolution entered both
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common experience and comment, personal computers are more often in
places where people use them alone, and their interactions with others are
through the machine rather than across the table or down the couch. However,
people also respond to what they see on screens in many ways that are similar
to how they respond to social encounters in real life. 123 And at the same time,
124
people expect to do things, to be engaged, with what they see on the screen.
Participating in mediated digital environments is, of course, what computer
gaming is all about. Multiplayer on-line games such as "Second Life" provide
complete social environments for their participants. 125 Successful play,
moreover, involves not just interacting with other players within a framework
of rules and protocols, but remaking one's digital world by reprogramming it.

Increasingly, prospective jurors (and not only younger ones) may come to
court with the expectation not only that witnesses and lawyers will navigate
multimedia presentations via pointing and clicking (as in the Skakel case), but
also that they will themselves be allowed to participate in the recreation of

legal reality.
Lawyers are already beginning to cater to people's expectation that, in the
digital era, information is something that they can and should be able to seek
out and interact with rather than something that they passively receive.
Consider the virtual reality view, a seamless, 360-degree representation of a
scene composited from digital or digitized photographs. Users navigate the
scene, moving in any direction and zooming in or out as desired. American
lawyers have used virtual reality views in a handful of cases as illustrative aids

workplaces and private spaces with unprecedented rapidity. In 1950, 8.8 percent of
American households owned a television; by 2005, 98 percent of households did. Susan
Ashworth, TV Facts Then & Now, DIGITAL WORLD, available at http://www.pcworld.com/
news/article/0,aid, 18945,00.asp (Feb. 2005). This progression seems modest when
compared to similar statistics for the World Wide Web. Before the Web was a public space,
in 1969, there were about eight hosting servers. In 2005 the number of servers is
approaching one billion (Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Timeline, HOSTS,
http://ww.zakon.org/Robert/intemet/timeline (last visited Apr. 17, 2006), and the number of
web sites, one hundred million. The number of users of the Internet, a prior creation that
enables the existence of the World Wide Web, doubled every one hundred days between
1994 and 1997. Some comparisons: it took thirty-eight years for radio to reach fifty million
listeners; television took thirteen years, and the Internet only four ("The Exponential
Growth of the Internet," http://www.unc.edu/depts/jomc/academics/dri/011/growth.html)
(citing U.S. Department of Commerce statistics).
123 See BYRON REEVES & CLIFFORD NASS, THE MEDIA EQUATION: How PEOPLE TREAT

COMPUTERS, TELEVISION, AND NEw MEDIA LIKE REAL PEOPLE AND PLACES (1996).

124 Indeed, for some the engagement with the machine and the virtual worlds it yields can
become an obsession. See, e.g., SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN (1995). Note that this
interactivity is not confined to computer screens; digital technology in the form of movies
on DVD has made it possible for viewers to interact as never before with what they see on
their television screens.
125Linden Research, Inc. Second Life (CD-ROM 2003).
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to clarify eyewitness testimony.1 26 Across the Atlantic, an even more complex
"virtual reality system" has been used by witnesses before the Bloody Sunday
Tribunal, established in 1998 to reexamine the facts of the 1972 killing of
thirteen Irish citizens by British soldiers in the streets of Derry. Interacting
with computer-generated views of various locations in Derry, witnesses have
been able to revisit scenes from any angle and draw arrows on the screen to
describe the events and movements they recalled. In some instances the virtual
reality system has enabled the Tribunal to confirm that it was physically
seeing, given the
possible for witnesses to have seen what they remembered
127
layout of the city and the witnesses' locations at the time.
Or consider the Soham double homicide case in Great Britain. The
defendant stood accused of the murder of two young girls. 128 The
government's case was circumstantial. At its heart were the sweater fibers
from the clothing worn by the two young female victims at the time of their
disappearance and death. The jurors not only got to see those fibers in open
court; the judge also gave them a DVD to play during their deliberations. 129 As
a result, in the course of reconstructing for themselves the story of the case, the
jurors were able to move freely among the digital evidence contained on the
disc, which included images of the fibers, the sweaters they came from, the
crime scene, the girls' route home, videotaped witness testimony, and other
evidentiary material. This kind of free-ranging interactivity with digital
evidence may foreshadow how legal meanings will be made in the digital era.
Lawyers may have to rethink their rhetorical strategies, making space for their
audiences to enter, and allowing them to feel that they are helping to construct
30
the case along with counsel. 1
Re-envisioning legal theory in the digital age turns our attention both to new
126 E-mail from Brian Carney, President, WIN Interactive, to Neal Feigenson (Feb. 8,

2005) (on file with author).
127The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006); see also Bennett, supra note 107; Whelan, supra note 36.
128Prosecution Key Points:Day One, BBC NEWS, Nov. 6, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/

hi/england/3243025.stm.
129 The prosecution team considered 6,820 statements, 7,341 exhibits and hundreds of
hours of video footage and media coverage. The police enquiry generated approximately
24,000 documents. Soham Murder Case: Huntley and Carr Guilty, THE CROWN
PROSECUTION SERVICE, Dec. 17, 2003, http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/archive/

139_03.html.
130In this essay we have largely assumed the continuation of current legal procedures,
but of course it is possible that the digital visual turn will lead to radical changes in those
procedures. See, e.g., Gordon Bermant, Courting the Virtual: Federal Courts in an Age of
Complete Inter-Connectedness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 527 (1999) (discussing virtual
proceedings); Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's
Celestial City, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1524 (1998) (describing trials consisting entirely of
previously prepared digital visual presentations, in which "trial advocacy will more closely
resemble the work of the Hollywood film producer and less that of the Hollywood actor").
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sources of meaning and to new meaning-making practices. Nearly a quarter of
a century ago, Robert Cover wrote:
We inhabit a nomos - a normative universe. We constantly create and
maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful ....No set
of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that
locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for
each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the
narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules
131
to be observed, but a world in which we live.
Law is a world in which we live. But to live in a nomos we need a corpus of
inherited texts and a common set of interpretive practices. Out of these
materials and practices we sustain and revise institutions, paradigms for
behavior, and patterns of discourse. A stable society agrees upon (at least to a
significant extent, although not without controversy and debate 132) a shared
repertoire of moves, "a lexicon of normative action,"' 133 that it recombines and
supplements to meet the needs of changing times.
The specific challenge that we face today is to translate, under new cultural
and technological conditions, the complexity of multidisciplinary discourse
into legal rhetoric and practice within the specific constraints and demands of
legal argumentation. To accomplish this task we need a toolkit for cultural
description and analysis, and for effective argumentation and legal problem
solving. That is what our constructivist approach is intended to offer.
This approach has multiple roots, including legal realism, legal pragmatism,
critical legal studies, law and literature, law and norms theory, and the more
recent genre of cultural legal studies. 134 A common denominator among these
131

Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-5 (1983).
e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993) (describing the notion

132 See,

of an "overlapping consensus" whereby people may disagree on particulars but reach
consensus at a higher level of abstraction); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE
AND THE LIBERAL STATE 358-59 (1980); EMILE DURKHEIM, SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 92
(D.F. Pocock trans., The Free Press 1974) (noting that "ideals could not survive if they were
not periodically revived" through religious or secular feasts and ceremonies); VICTOR
TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS 50-56 (1974) (describing the ritualized renewal

of social meaning and deep cultural values through the performative dialectic of "social
structures" and "communitas").
133 Cover, supra note 135, at 9. See also WERNER JAEGER, PAImIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK

CULTURE xiv, xxvi (1939) ("[T]he basis of education is a general consciousness of the
values which govern human life.... The Greek trinity of poet, statesman, and sage
embodied the state's highest ideal of leadership.").
134 See

generally, ROSEMARY

J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL

LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTIES (1998); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999); Law and the
Order of Culture, 30 REPRESENTATIONS (1990); LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE (Austin

Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,1998); Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural
Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1149 (1997); Susan S. Silbey, Making a Place for
CulturalAnalyses of Law, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39 (1992); Symposium, A New Legal
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diverse approaches to legal studies is multidisciplinarity. Notably, cultural
studies, out of which the cultural legal studies movement emerged, has been
providing scholars outside the legal academy with interdisciplinary tools since
the late 1970s. 135 Cultural studies focuses on the production, circulation, and
assimilation of symbolic forms. It is largely136concerned with how institutions
and local practices generate social meanings.
Cultural legal studies adopts this focus, seeking to go beyond appellate case
law, statutory interpretation, and social policy, the dominant topics of law
teaching and academic writing, in order to more broadly encompass legal
meaning making practices throughout society. 137 Simply stated, the central
question that cultural legal studies asks is: What are the popular cultural codes,
the familiar schemas and scripts, the common vocabularies of motive and
intentionality, and the hierarchy of beliefs and values that are in play within a
given site of legal conflict? As Barbara Yngvesson has written, "'[t]he spirit of
law' ... is not simply invented at the top but is transformed, challenged, and
reinvented in local practices that produce a plural legal culture in contemporary
America." 138 Whether it is starting rumor campaigns to contest corporate
control over cultural symbols, 139 getting a court clerk to admit a story of abuse
as a legal claim, 140 or resisting mediators who construct images of problems in
therapeutic as opposed to legal terms, 141 these practices at the local level
constitute the "microphysics of power" (to use a Foucauldian phrase). Cultural
legal studies' multidisciplinary microanalyses of concrete legal practices
counterbalance, without eradicating the need for, critical theory. By proffering
localized strategies of rhetorical affirmation and belief, they complement the
prevailing ethos of suspicion that marked (and ultimately undercut) critical
legal studies.
The constructivist approach that we have outlined in this essay extends prior
theory in several directions. First, we invite an even more broadly
interdisciplinary (and thus arguably more fully pragmatic) method. The cluster
of conceptual tools that we have discussed and applied above is merely
illustrative of a much more comprehensive lawyer' s toolkit, a yet-to-be-written

Realism? Cultural Studies and the Law, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001).
135 See, e.g., STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING THE STATE, AND LAW
AND ORDER (1978); RAYMOND WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS IN MATERIALISM AND CULTURE (1980).

136 See

generally Terence Turner, Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What

Is

Anthropology That Multiculturalists Should Be Mindful of It?, 8 CULT. ANTHROP. 411
(1993).
137 Sherwin, supra note 50, at 17.
138 Barbara Yngvesson, Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal

Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1689, 1693 (1989).
"' See Coombe, supra note 138 at 143-65.
140 See Yngvesson, supra note 142 at 1700-01.
141Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, MediatorSettlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y 7,
10 (1986).
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rhetorical handbook for the digital age. Second, we expand the search for the
constitutive elements of legal consciousness - which is to say, the cultural
materials out of which legal meanings are shaped, disseminated, and absorbed
- to explicitly encompass the quotidian world of graphic design, film,
television, and the Intemet, among other digital and multimedia resources.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, we urge the study, from multiple
perspectives and with an eye toward their theoretical, pragmatic, and
pedagogical ramifications, of the manifestations of legal consciousness in the
visual and digital media that have come to pervade the practice of law.
With the ascendancy of electronic monitors both inside the courtroom and
out, students, teachers, and practitioners of law must be able to account for the
everyday associations that decision makers bring to the screen. They must also
be able to accommodate the familiar programs and information schemas that
viewers absorb from computers at home and in the office. By the same token,
they will also need to come to grips with changing expectations among
decision makers who have grown accustomed to surfing screen data for
themselves. As computer users internalize the thinking tools provided by
software in conjunction with Internet-bred habits of data searching via free
association, adjustments may be needed in legal communication and advocacy.
In short, legal education must adapt to the contingencies of technology and the
emerging vernacular of digital culture and the digital mind. 142 We therefore
turn to that part of our approach which addresses the study of law in a visual
and digital culture.

IV.

RE-ENVISIONING LEGAL EDUCATION

To be prepared to enter the new landscape of professional practice, law
students have to do far more than become acquainted with the new visual
technologies being used in the law today. They need to understand how new
(and more established) visual technologies change the ways that their users and
their audiences think. They need to develop a critical visual intelligence that
enables them to anticipate the cognitive and emotional effects of visual and
multimedia displays and to respond to their adversaries' visual and multimedia
presentations. They need to become conversant with the expanded toolkit of
conceptual and technological resources that we have described above, not
simply in order to communicate and persuade more effectively, but also
because this multidisciplinary toolkit is precisely what will inform their
appreciation of how visual displays can affect legal thinking, judgment, and
meaning-making as a whole. In short, they need to become visually literate.
Since 2000, the authors of this essay have been teaching a course that
introduces upper-level law students to the knowledge and skills needed to
practice law in the digital age. 143 We believe that the pedagogic vision behind
142 See generally LESSIG, supra note 22.

143 For a more detailed discussion of the course we teach, see Christina 0. Spiesel,

Richard K. Sherwin, & Neal Feigenson, Law in the Age of Images: The Challenge of Visual
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our course is suggestive of what needs to be undertaken to bring legal
instruction into the digital multimedia age.
At its core, visual literacy means being able to identify the meanings that
pictures leave unsaid and to translate those perceptions into words. We provide
our students with a conceptual frame consisting of the interdisciplinary
approach described in Part III, but we do not simply present bodies of
knowledge and expect our students to apply that knowledge to legal visual
displays. Visual literacy cannot be learned from a handbook. It is a matter of
connoisseurship. Students must become conscious of their own responses to
pictures, attend to others' responses, and discern the cultural meanings that are
circulated when a picture is understood to refer implicitly to other pictures,
other words, and other media.
Students can develop these skills only through experience in interpreting
and making visual displays. When students are provided with many
opportunities to interpret visual displays, they not only become conscious of
their own responses, but also learn how to articulate those responses in order to
make them accessible to others. Just as writing is taught along with reading, so
making visual arguments is as critical as interpretation to the development of
visual literacy. Only by making pictures can students understand the range of
visual (and verbal) rhetorical choices available to them, and when they do, they
are no longer held captive by the idea of the legal picture as mere illustration or
metonym for reality. Instead, they grasp it as a construction, their construction,
suitable for reframing as desired within the context of their case strategy,
informed by the multidisciplinary toolkit we provide.
Law students come to law school with a readiness for this kind of
instruction. Almost all enter with extensive experience in watching: they have
been going to the movies, watching television, playing video games on their
PCs or gaming hardware, and surfing the Web. Some have even been going to
museums and galleries to see art. They have acquired detailed knowledge of
the visual codes embedded in these cultural products. But they have rarely
been asked to discuss their own responses. Their knowledge is unavailable to
them because it has largely not been examined.
The combination of interpreting and making that students need to hone their
responses to legal visual displays is not likely to have been cultivated in their
previous education. Even if students have studied art history, they have most
likely simply studied the views of authorities on the works under scrutiny
rather than articulating their own responses. 144 Moreover, art history and
Literacy, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 231 (Anne Wagner, Tracy
Summerfield, & Farid Benavides eds., 2005). We have also been teaching workshops to
practicing lawyers that are guided by the same pedagogic ideas. See also Neal Feigenson
and Christina Spiesel, Teaching Visual Rhetoric to Law Students, in VISUAL PRACTICES

ACROSS THE UNIVERSITY (James Elkins ed., forthcoming 2006).
'" Art history itself has had difficulty in embracing the large expanse of visual culture
outside of the masterworks that are part of the Western canon - cultural studies has taken up
that slack - although that has been changing in the last twenty years or so. See, e.g., Elkins,
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cultural studies as academic subjects rarely provide any experiences in making
visual things. The arts curricula that stress making things, on the other hand,
are by and large aimed at training future professional artists. They are
organized to produce a progressive development of certain technical skills
instead of the viewing and thinking habits that lawyers need in their own
professional practice: the ability to respond intelligently to pictures in the
moment, relying on their own judgment rather than on "authoritative" readings
145
by others.
Becoming receptive to the range of responses that people have to pictures,
thereby discovering the ways in which different people's responses might
overlap and identifying the elements in the picture that provoke those
responses, may seem to parallel on the level of pictures the verbal thinking
146
habits that Richard Fischel and Jeremy Paul examine in Getting to Maybe,
their study of how law students can best learn to think like lawyers. There is,
however, a big difference between the discipline of words in legal education
and the sporulation of pictorial meaning. The traditional inputs of legal
education - casebooks, other texts, and the authoritative speech of the
professor - are all verbal, as are the traditional outputs: the student's
understanding as expressed in classroom discussion, exams, and other written
work. Even if one agrees with Elizabeth Mertz 147 that much of legal education
consists in mastering new ways of reading, the fundamental problem for law
students studying responses to pictures (or their own internal mental imagery)
is, as we have observed, that images must be translated into words to become
socially available. They may not be aware that in that translation there is
always a slippage, a loss of data.
In order to keep students aware of this process, while fostering their abilities
to recognize and articulate their engagement with pictures, the classroom must
be reconfigured. Our pedagogic toolkit, like the conceptual toolkit described in
Part III above, is varied. 148 We incorporate many features of traditional
supra note 82, at 68; DAvID FREEDBERG, THE POWER OF IMAGES xix (1989); PICTURING
SCIENCE, PRODUCING ART (Caroline A. Jones & Peter Galison eds., 1998).
45 Practicing lawyers rarely have time to research the pictures that they and others make,
and in any event, most legal visuals are one-of-a-kind pictures, made for the occasion and
lacking any critical bibliography. Lawyers must therefore be prepared to exercise their own
judgment under time pressure rather than rely on authoritative readings - quite different
from the discipline of art history or, for that matter, from the legal convention of arguing
from precedent.
146 RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE (1999).

147 Elizabeth Mertz, Recontextualization As Socialization: Text and Pragmatics in the
Law School Classroom (Am. B. Found., Working Paper No. 9418, 1993).
148 The idea of the pedagogic toolkit is anticipated by James Eagar, The Right Tool for
the Job: The Effective Use of PedagogicalMethods in Legal Education, 32 GONZ. L. REv.
389 (1996). There is enough discussion in the academy these days about legal pedagogy to
have generated a ninety-nine page bibliography just on specific classroom methodologies
with fairly restrictive selection criteria. See Arturo L6pez Torres & Mary Kay Lundwall,
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doctrinal and clinical teaching methods but combine them in new ways and
modify them to suit the overall goal of developing visual literacy. For instance,
as in the traditional Socratic method, we ordinarily launch discussion and
analysis by posing questions. Unlike that method as usually practiced,
however, we do not argue with the responses to pictures that students offer.
Responses to pictures are not arguable in the same way that responses to legal
texts are. Absent an extensive tradition of critical interpretation and without
readings that have been applied over time, there can be no appeal to more
authoritative texts or to any consensus of scholars. 149 As in the problem
method, we create hypothetical cases as the context for the students' major
course projects. The cases require them to use a variety of legal sources as well
as diverse background materials, and they are expected to identify and explore
issues just as they would in a traditional law school class. What they spot,
however, is as likely to be a communicative or rhetorical issue as a strictly
legal one. As in the simulation method, students are expected to do a version of
actual legal work (making a piece of demonstrative evidence or a visual final
argument, respectively), but instead of engaging in a full role-play (e.g.,
performing a negotiation or portion of a mock trial), students step out of role
and explain to their classmates their rhetorical choices, the thinking behind the
visuals they constructed. 50 Relatedly, although students do see examples of
professional legal visuals used in actual cases, it is their own work (on major
course projects and several smaller visual exercises) that provides the primary
picture texts for classroom response and discussion. 15' Finally, we do not use
pre-designed legal instruction software packages. Students' only instruction in
technology per se arises from their use of it to realize their ideas in their own

Moving Beyond Langdell 11: An Annotated Bibliography of Current Methods for Law
Teaching,35 GONZ. L. REv. 1 (1999).
... A fortiori, we rarely lecture because it tends to make students passive in relation to
the material and, unlike other subjects, there are no textbooks or treatises for the students to
fall back on to learn what they need to about visual thinking.
150An important benefit in taking students out of role (and a fortiori, in not convening
the course to a clinical experience in which students represent real clients in real matters) is
that much of the learning occurs when student work goes well beyond the bounds of
admissibility (even granted that the admissibility of visual displays for which a proper
foundation has been laid is frequently an open-ended judgment call, requiring the court to
balance probative value against risk of prejudice and confusion under Fed. R. Evid. 403 or
the state law equivalent). Rather than being an occasion for a poor grade, such work often
prompts the most productive kind of discussion: Why would the display probably not be

admissible in court? What was the student attempting to accomplish with that display, and
how might the student achieve the same rhetorical goals while staying within the limits of
admissibility?
151 Eagar, supra note 152, at 411-12, writes that audio-visual materials are likely to be
welcomed as supplements to the classroom materials, but he envisions them as being
brought in by the professor as part of the lecture or discussion planning - once again, a topdown approach.
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projects. 152 In the course of their work, they discover what software like
PowerPoint lets them do and what it does not; they become aware of the
software's implicit point of view in dialogue with their own rhetorical goals.
In a visual literacy class, if the professor tries to constrain the meaning of
pictures (or picture-making technologies) for the student, the game is lost.
Students will be unwilling to share their perceptions and will not have the
opportunity to hear the variety of responses so crucial to their learning
experience. The alternative to professorial control, however, is not the
overturning of the entire methodology of legal education. It is to redesign the
classroom on the model of the focus group. In focus groups, studentparticipants share their own responses to pictures, share speculations on how
meanings might shift with subtle changes in the picture, and discuss the

picture's intended audience(s). The aim is not to train design professionals. It
is to train future lawyers who will know to pay attention to all of the elements
that visual media put in play and who will be much better at strategizing and
designing their cases by thinking visually and, when desired, at using the
services of design professionals to accomplish their goals. 153 Practice in
working in collaborative environments will also enhance students' readiness
for the legal workplace, where they will often work with teams of lawyers,
154
staff, and (sometimes) legal consultants.
In sum, we contend that when it comes to visual literacy and persuasion, the
structure of authority in the classroom must change. It must be decentered in
order to facilitate a creative process that works more from the bottom up (and
out) than from the top down. The growing use of new visual technologies even
in traditional classrooms is readying the ground for this change. While law

152 To bring students up to speed on the advanced digital video editing software (Final
Cut Pro or Premiere®) that they use to create their final projects (closing argument videos),
we provide individual workshops that cover only the simplest aspects of editing. Any other
guidance we offer is in response to students' own requests for assistance in realizing their
own editing ideas. We do not impose any overall approach to the software.
153 All of the legal visual professionals with whom we have spoken have testified that it
is much better to think about visualizing the case as the case is developed rather than to
think about visuals later as add-ons to a verbally developed strategy. These comments come
partly from the designer's understanding that the thinking in the design can help the thinking
with the case, even suggesting avenues of investigation, and also from the knowledge that a
compelling design can take time to develop. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
154 Without quarreling with the conclusions of the MacCrate Report (Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional
Development - An EducationalContinuum A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. &ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, (1992)), we observe that the Report simply does not address the kinds of concerns we
have raised in this essay. Visual literacy might well be included among the practical skills
that the authors of the Report enumerated, but it is (as we hope to have shown) an entirely
distinct skill set. Moreover, issues of professionalism, ethics, and other topics that the
Report addresses play out in distinctive ways in the context of visual communication and
advocacy.
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students still use colored marking pens to analyze their study materials,1 5 and
will probably continue to do so because such visual mapping is useful, they
will soon be reading hybrid texts where they move from time-based linear
thinking (i.e., one word unfolding after another) to visual collages in which
meanings are laid out spatially as well as temporally and the cues to reading
those meanings are very different. 156 Students already do something like this
when a professor projects a transparency or PowerPoint graphic, or charts a
legal transaction with a marker on a whiteboard; they attend to the spoken
words of the lecture while reading the graphic representation and writing their
own notes. We suggest that students will do this even more frequently without
the participation of a professor's voice to organize the relationships. The visual
and digital turns combine in transforming the process of education into
something more (inter)active, placing more responsibility on the student to
seek out and reconfigure the words and pictures needed to accomplish the task
at hand.
Discussions of vision, visuality, and visual culture abound in the non-legal
academy today, 57 but tend to miss the point that pictures are not just about
aesthetics. People outside the law school environment who learn of our
teaching often remark, "Oh, you are teaching art to law students." The answer
to that is a resounding "no." We are teaching visual thinking and visual
rhetoric; we are teaching about visual texts and how they can be used to
convey information as well as arguments. We teach how lawyers can deploy
visual culture as well as verbal culture to make their points. That people
respond as they do betrays a confusion - that picturing can be thought of only
as art itself, opening the door to forbidden pleasures in the severe realm of the
law. To the contrary, lawyers and law students need to understand that making
pictures, just like writing, can be an effort to think aloud 158 or to communicate
59
for specific purposes. Picturing, like speaking or writing, is perfonnative,1

155 ROBERT H. MILLER, LAW SCHOOL CONFIDENTIAL 133 (2004); SCOTT TUROW, ONE L

56 (1977).
156 Many law students already do this during class, but not entirely with regard to the
class's ostensible subject matter (much to the chagrin of some professors. See, e.g., John
Schwartz, Professors Vie with Web for Class's Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2003, at A1).

Students scan online news, IM their classmates, and play games while sometimes also
scrolling through class notes and case briefs in an attempt to maintain sufficient contact with
the professor's presentation. One goal for law teachers is to capture more of students'
technological savvy and viewing and reading habits and redirect them toward the course
subject matter. See also supra note 125 (discussing hybrid legal texts).
117 Readers interested in sampling the rich literature in this area might enjoy THE VISUAL
CULTURE READER (Nicholas Mirzoeff ed,, 1998). The authors recently participated in the
first International Conference on Visual Literacy, held at University College, Cork, Ireland
on April 14-15, 2005. A conference and exhibition volume, to be edited by James Elkins, is
forthcoming.
158 See supra text following note 161.
159 See J. L. AUSTIN, supra note 4.
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and recognizing that is especially crucial in law, where justice depends on the
rhetoric lawyers deploy to persuade judges and juries.
Our pedagogy, like our overall approach to the role of visuals in law,
implicates the complex relationship between words and pictures throughout
our culture's history. This topic is dense because of the enduring and everchanging contest between the two modalities, 160 and because of ambiguity in
the meaning of "to see" that goes all the way back to the Greek opposition of
"insight" to perception, generally to the denigration of the latter. 161 Space
limitations prohibit us from doing more here than simply taking note of this
rich historical subject. Our ambition is limited to the hope that we have shown
how words and pictures can be understood as complementary ways of talking
about and doing things in the world, and how law students can be given the
experiences from which that understanding can be cultivated further. As the
world of law, both in and out of court, is increasingly made available through
visually designed digital environments - texts subsumed within framing
pictures, displayed on electronic screens - this understanding becomes more
necessary than ever.
V.

THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

The meanings that hold a world together must be actively experienced,
performed, and thereby re-enacted, at least on occasion, so that the wellsprings
of commitment may be refreshed. This meaning making and meaning
conserving process is the primary function of law. As James Boyd White has
written, law is best understood as a constitutive rhetoric:
The law establishes roles and relations and voices, and it gives us as
speakers the materials and methods of a discourse. It is a way of creating
a rhetorical community over time. It is this discourse, working in the
social context of its own creation, this language in the fullest sense of the
162
term, that is the law. It makes us members of a common world.
We believe that this constructivist ("rhetorical") model of law remains apt,
in both theory and practice. 163 Its emphasis on "talk" and the written word,
however, needs to be updated. The domain of legal discourse must be
expanded to include the digital capacity to generate, alter, and disseminate
visual representations on the screen. And the study of law as a constitutive
rhetoric must now encompass the various ways in which this digital capacity
affects the legal meaning making process. In what ways has the conflict of

See generally MITCHELL, ICONOLOGY, supra note 15.
161For an incisive discussion of this and anti-ocularism in contemporary thought
'60

generally, see MARTIN JAY, DOWNCAST EYES: THE DENIGRATION OF VISION IN TWENTIETH-

CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT (1994).
162 White, supra note 19, at 266 (emphasis in original).
163 For a brilliant defense of law as constitutive rhetoric, see Anthony T. Kronman,

Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 677 (1999).
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interpretations, that mainstay of the common law tradition, been recast by the
advent of digital technology?
In our view, retooling the legal mind so that it may be better adapted to
function effectively in a legal (and popular) culture transformed by new
communication technologies constitutes the most pressing challenge before the
legal academy today. The task is to make sense of the nature and practice of
law in a non-essentialist, screen-dominated, and pervasively visual
environment. What kinds of knowledge and meaning are created, and with
what outcomes, when knowledge and meaning are visually and digitally
constructed in particular ways? And what are the implications for the search
for truth and the perennial clashes between knowledge and eloquence, rational
dialectics and rhetoric, ethical obligation and aesthetic pleasure (aesthesis), and
belief and disenchantment in the current digital age? 164
For example, as more people, practiced in the techniques of digital
production, come to realize the manifold ways in which perceived realities
may be constructed or changed, a new skepticism may emerge. Will people
sense ever-greater disjunctions between representations and reality, and if so,
how will legal advocates reassert the authority of truth claims? Conversely,
how will law in the age of digital visual displays cope with the mind's default
capacity for acceptance and belief? 165 Will new levels of visual and media
literacy meet the demands of critically confronting persuasive images on the
screen? Or will the digital engineering of belief and judgment tighten its grip
on the mind? 166 Will people's capacity to distinguish between fiction and
167
reality simply diminish?
As legal scholars pursue the interpenetrations of law and culture in the
digital and visual era, basic questions about the continued vitality of
democratic principles are bound to emerge with new vigor. Lawyers'
increasing use of visual and multimedia displays may have a profound
164 Our focus in this article has been on pictures and images in law that create challenges

for decision making, judgment, and belief in legal theory and practice. There is a small but
growing literature that explores what pictures of the law reveal about how the law is
regarded at the time the pictures are produced. Older works tended to project images of law
as a sacred, protected space where meanings could be authoritatively constrained. The
widespread entry of all kinds of picturing into this space (and the projection, via videotape
and television, of portions of that space that had not previously been thus depicted, e.g.,
selected trials and jury deliberations) may call into question the mythic roots of society's
ideas of justice. See, e.g., Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J.
1727 (1987); Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind? The Challenge of Images to the Law, in
LAW AND THE IMAGE

19-35 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999); Ana Laurel Nettel

The Power of image and the Image of Power: The Case of Law, 21 WORD & IMAGE 136
(2005).
165 See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
" As leading scholars of advertising and public relations imply. See, e.g., STUART
EWEN, PR! A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN (1996); JAMES B. TWITCHELL, ADCULT USA (1996).
167 See RITCHIN, supra note 125, at 7-23.
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democratizing effect. Complex events and relationships and their legal
significances may become more, not less, intelligible to attentive jurors and the
public, reducing the appeal of verbal obfuscations. Finders of fact may become
more fully engaged in thinking through the issues if they understand the
evidence better. And as access to and familiarity with the means of visual
production become more widespread, the power to make and disseminate
images and thus to participate in the creation of cultural meanings, legal and
168
otherwise, will also be more widely shared.
Or the prospects for a legal culture in which visual rhetoric predominates
may be less sanguine. Contemporary advertising, "the most successful
rhetorical enterprise on the planet," 169 has been described as what Aristotle
labeled epideictic rhetoric. 170 Unlike deliberative and forensic rhetorics, the
traditional province of lawyers, epideictic rhetoric does not set forth
propositional arguments building logically to a conclusion, but instead aims to
move the audience to reaffirm common values they all presumably share. In
the case of product advertising, the values are those particular ones with which
the advertiser hopes to associate the product, as well as the more general value

of happiness-through-consumption,

implicated

with

a

quasi-religious

confidence. 71 Political campaign films, similarly, may celebrate "tradition,
hope, productivity, defense, patriotism, innocence" or any number of other

presumably

shared values,

evoking

these values

through imagistic,

associational logic. 172 To be sure, skillful legal advocates have always engaged
in epideictic discourse as well: recall, for instance, Gerry Spence's celebrations
of individual freedom in the face of government tyranny as a way to persuade
Ruby Ridge jurors to acquit his client. 173 But what happens if, through
increasing use of pictures and associational logic, legal discourse takes on even
more of the character of epideictic rhetoric - at the expense of logic and
168 See VAr-rIMO, supra note 16, at xvii, 10 ("From the beginning the metaphysical
attempt to grasp the archg, the first principle, was inspired by the will to dominate the
totality of things."). Note the normative implication, then, of the post-metaphysical turn:
The shift to a matrix of interpretations removes the political shadow of totalized norms or
meanings. As Vattimo puts it, "thought has no source of legitimation beyond the effective
aperture of Being within which it finds itself thrown." Id. at 11. As Ricoeur put it, we are
left with no more (and no less) than "a conflict of interpretations." The ceaseless
competition among localized interpretations becomes the renewed basis for a liberal,
tolerant, and democratic society. RICOEUR, supra note 1, at 48
169 Stephen McKenna, Advertising as Epideictic Rhetoric, in RHETORIC, THE POLLS, AND

THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 103, 103 (C. Jan Swearingen & Dave Pruett eds., 1998).
170See, e.g., JOANNE MORREALE, A NEW BEGINNING: A TEXTUAL FRAME ANALYSIS OF

THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FILM 93-100 (1991); McKenna, supra note 173, at 105-08.

171 McKenna, supra note 173, at 105-06; see also KIBBEY, supra note 124, at 10-20.
172 See MORREALE, supra note 174, at 3 (describing how Ronald Reagan's campaign film
A New Beginning served as a display of his "rhetoric: discourse characterized by optimistic,
upbeat, patriotic themes that emphasized a renewed sense of national identity and unity.")
173 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

2006]

LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE

critical analysis? Will the consequence for legal argument (not to mention
public discourse as a whole) be a decline in rational deliberation and decision
making or simply a shift in the conventional criteria for proof and persuasion?
We do not yet know the answers to these questions, but we believe that the
questions must be asked.
To what extent will the power that attaches to legal meanings stream down
from an elite group of culture producers, and to what extent will it percolate up
and out from the needs, desires, and imaginings of the public at large? The
answer to this used to be relatively simple: those with power were able to
exercise significant control. The Internet has changed this dynamic. The story
of Marcus Arnold, the fifteen-year-old who became the Internet's highest-rated
1 74
legal advice giver, provides an intriguing, albeit inconclusive, indicator.
Marcus believed that he had learned enough law from watching television to
give legal advice without conducting actual research. Notably, after his age and
modus operandi became known, his popularity was undiminished. Is this a
tribute to Marcus's communicative skills (as well as a slap at the profession's
communicative failings)? Does it portend the ascendancy of a populist ("knownothing") legal culture which operates to the detriment of counterintuitive legal
expertise? Again, these are the sorts of questions that we believe legal scholars
and lawyers, practicing and aspiring, ought to be asking. We count among the
virtues of the pedagogy that we described earlier its capacity to help make law
students more cognizant of these issues and to equip them with more of the
tools they need to search for answers.
We believe that our emphasis on the visual mediation of legal thinking and
legal judgment, our constructivist method for understanding, and our pedagogy
offer an affirmative response to questions that ultimately go to the heart of both
law and democracy in the digital visual era. Pictures are silent until people
speak about them, and when people do, they begin to compare perspectives
and construct socially available meanings. Learning how to respond critically
to pictures and to articulate individual responses is, therefore, essential to
understanding how visual meanings are constructed and what beliefs pictures
engender (or suppress) in particular situations. An ethos emerges out of the
collective practice of making, reflecting, and remaking - modeled in our
classrooms, but applicable by extension to other collectives, whether the
deliberating jury or the debating blogosphere. 175 It is the ethos of the
autocatalyzed, self-sustaining group, a process in which each participant
inspires and teaches others with ever less explicit guidance from "above," with
the eventual result being the generation of a shared group culture. We do not
know how this experience will carry over into the larger and more complex

174 See MICHAEL LEWIS, NEXT: THE FUTURE JUST HAPPENED 90-109

(2001) (describing
the story of Marcus Arnold).
175 As of March 2006, it is estimated that there are over 27 million blogs on the Web,
with the number doubling every five and a half months. Peter Jaret, Dear Web Log: Hated
the Shampoo, Loved the Soap, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at G3.
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world of professional practice, but we believe that using the multidisciplinary
tools we have described in this essay to make and critique images empowers
people to become more active participants in both popular and legal culture.
We also believe that lawyers who are able to navigate the new currents that
pervade our social and cultural lives as well as our lives in the law will become
better guides in the face of a crucial, and shared, rhetorical challenge: whether
76
it is more prudent to exercise belief or suspicion under specific conditions. 1
Meeting this challenge will require a new intellectual framework for law,
one that incorporates not only the familiar word-and-text mode of legal
thinking but also the pervasively visual, hypermediated, and digital mode that
increasingly characterizes the practice of law today. In short, the imperative
that legal scholars face is to rethink the theory and practice of law in and
through the visual. Thus we may begin to come to grips with the various ways
in which visual communication technologies are transforming the practice,
theory, and teaching of law in the digital age.

76 See Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal

Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1988).

